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EUGENE KONTOROVICH† 
Nor is the aggravation of the crime for the trial of which a tribunal may 
be instituted[] a cogent motive for assenting to the principle of subject-
ing American citizens . . . to the decision of foreign courts; for although 
Great Britain . . . may be willing to abandon those of her subjects who 
defy the laws and tarnish the character of their country[] by [committing 
human rights abuses], to the dispensation of justice even by foreign 
hands, the United States are bound to remember that the power which 
enables a court to try the guilty, authorizes them also to pronounce 
upon the fate of the innocent; and that the very question of guilt or in-
nocence is that which the protecting care of their Constitution has re-
served for the citizens of this Union, to the exclusive decision of their 
own countrymen.  
John Quincy Adams
1
 
 
The United States’ participation in international courts and, in particu-
lar, its potential accession to the International Criminal Court (ICC), a court 
that would have jurisdiction over U.S. nationals and U.S. territory, raise se-
rious constitutional questions.  These questions were thoroughly analyzed in the 
course of the debate about the constitutionality of international courts proposed 
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1 42 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 3012 (1823) (letter from John Quincy Adams to 
Stratford Canning). 
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by Britain in the early nineteenth century, an episode that has never before been 
examined for its relevance to current legal and policy debates.  This Article 
presents that historical debate and draws lessons for the present. 
The permissibility of the United States joining international tribunals 
spans several major constitutional issues:  the delegation of federal powers to 
supernational institutions; the limits, if any, on what the treaty power can do; 
and the vesting of judicial power in non–Article III courts.  While these are all 
famously confused and contentious areas of law, the preponderance of scholarly 
opinion concludes that the Constitution does not bar the United States from 
joining international courts, including the ICC. 
The jurisprudence and literature on these questions, however, have neg-
lected an important precedent.  In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, a network 
of international tribunals to punish slave trading was created.  Many Euro-
pean nations joined these “mixed courts.”  The United States, however, saw the 
courts as unconstitutional.  It refused to join the mixed-court system for forty-
five years, a period that spanned eleven presidencies.  Constitutional objections 
were formulated by some of the leading statesmen of the early Republic and even 
by some members of the founding generation.  They were unanimous in their 
view that the Constitution forbids joining an international criminal court with 
jurisdiction over American nationals. 
They raised several constitutional objections of both structural and indi-
vidual-rights varieties.  The United States complained, in a long series of dip-
lomatic missives, that such a court’s decisions would not be reviewable by the 
Supreme Court and that, even more importantly, the court would subject U.S. 
nationals to criminal trials without a jury and other Bill of Rights protections.  
These objections were unanimously held in James Monroe’s distinguished Cab-
inet, shared by Congress, and undisputed by anyone for decades. 
This Article examines the constitutional objections stated at the time of the 
slave-trade courts and shows that some, but not all, international criminal 
courts are likely to be unconstitutional, while noncriminal international tri-
bunals are far less problematic.  The foregoing suggests that it would be un-
constitutional to join an international criminal court with jurisdiction over 
certain offenses, some of which are within the ICC’s charter.  The evidence pre-
sented here can guide the tailoring of such courts’ jurisdiction to avoid consti-
tutional conflicts.   
Aside from the precedential significance, the nineteenth-century discussion 
of why joining such a court would be impermissible speaks directly to today’s 
constitutional jurisprudence in modern terms.  It provides surprisingly relevant 
guidance on questions such as the permissibility of non–Article III courts, consti-
tutional restraints on the treaty power, and the binding effect of judgments of 
international courts.  Additionally, nearly every argument made today about 
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American exceptionalism in international law and concerning the conflict between 
domestic and international law was rehearsed nearly two hundred years ago. 
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INTRODUCTION 
International courts2 play a small but growing role in resolving in-
terstate disputes as well as in directly applying criminal law to individ-
uals.  The United States’ participation in such tribunals raises an array 
of serious constitutional questions—questions that are particularly ur-
gent in light of the United States’ potential accession to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC), for this court would have jurisdiction 
over U.S. nationals and U.S. territory.3  This Article presents perhaps 
the best source of understanding these questions:  the discussion of 
the constitutionality of joining international courts to try slave traders 
in the early nineteenth century.  This obscure episode has never be-
fore been examined for its relevance to current constitutional debates. 
The permissibility of the United States joining international tri-
bunals spans two major constitutional issues:  the vesting of judicial 
power in non–Article III courts and the delegation of federal powers 
to supernational institutions through the treaty power.4  Both areas of 
law are known for their zigzagging lines of cases and contentious aca-
demic debate.  Nonetheless, the preponderance of scholarly opinion 
 
2 This Article uses the terms “courts” and “tribunals” interchangeably unless oth-
erwise specified.  
3 See Press Release, Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, American Society for International Law 
Task Force Issues Recommendations on U.S. Policy Toward the International Criminal 
Court (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/pressreleases/pr090202.pdf  
(recommending that the United States consider joining the ICC).  
4 See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations:  
New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 93-99, 110-12 (2000) (exploring 
how “delegations to international organizations can . . . create conflicts with the Con-
stitution’s basic structural requirements”); John O. McGinnis, Medellín and the Future 
of International Delegation, 118 YALE L.J. 1712, 1742-47 (2009) (discussing how the Trea-
ty Clause “answers the [constitutional] complaints under . . . Article III” by creating the 
“capacity to enter into international federations and create international tribunals” 
that have “binding power under [U.S.] law”). 
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concludes that the Constitution permits U.S. participation in the ICC 
and similar tribunals.5 
The literature on these questions, however, has neglected an im-
portant precedent.  In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain 
created a network of international tribunals to punish slave trading.  
Many European nations joined these “mixed courts.”  The United 
States refused to participate, arguing that the Constitution forbade 
joining an international criminal court with jurisdiction over Ameri-
can nationals.  The constitutional objections were formulated by some 
of the leading statesmen of the early Republic, including some mem-
bers of the founding generation.  As with the ICC, an initial rebuff by 
the United States did not end efforts to secure U.S. membership.  
Still, the United States stayed aloof from the mixed-court system for 
forty-five years—a period spanning eleven presidencies with varied 
politics and attitudes toward Britain, international engagement, and 
the slave trade. 
This history raises serious questions about the constitutionality of 
joining the ICC or other international tribunals that would have juris-
diction over U.S. nationals.  The evidence presented in this Article 
suggests that giving an international criminal court jurisdiction over 
certain offenses within the ICC’s charter would generally be unconsti-
tutional.  This does not mean, however, that U.S. participation in in-
ternational criminal courts would always be unconstitutional.  While 
the ICC runs afoul of constitutional limitations, the story of the slave-
 
5 See, e.g., AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT:  FURTHERING POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT 41 (2009), available at http:// 
www.asil.org/files/ASIL-08-DiscPaper2.pdf (concluding that “these [constitutional] 
concerns do not present any insurmountable obstacles to joining the Court”); LOUIS 
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 270 (2d ed. 1996) 
(stating that U.S. participation in the ICC “would not be constitutionally trouble-
some”); David Scheffer & Ashley Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983, 1065-68 (2008) (concluding 
that ratification of the Rome Statute would be constitutional); Ruth Wedgwood, The 
Constitution and the ICC (discussing the United States’ past participation in internation-
al tribunals and concluding that “there is no forbidding constitutional obstacle to U.S. 
participation in [the ICC]”), in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT:  NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 119, 121-22 (Sarah B. Se-
wall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000); see also Monroe Leigh, Editorial Comment, The United 
States and the Statute of Rome, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 124, 131 (2001) (dismissing as “totally 
misplaced” the “criticism that under the ICC United States service personnel will be 
denied due process protections”).  But see Lee A. Casey, The Case Against the Internation-
al Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 840, 841-42 (2002) (arguing that ratification 
of the Rome Statute would not only be inconsistent with American democracy but also 
unconstitutional). 
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trade courts shows that some international criminal courts could be 
constitutional.  Thus, the evidence presented here can guide the tai-
loring of such courts’ jurisdiction to avoid constitutional conflicts.  In 
light of this evidence, noncriminal international tribunals seem far 
less problematic. 
Aside from having precedential significance, the nineteenth-
century discussion of why joining such a court would be impermissible 
speaks directly to today’s constitutional jurisprudence and helps draw 
lines between permissible and impermissible international delegations 
of judicial authority.  It is also an untapped source of guidance on other 
leading constitutional questions, such as the domestic use of non–
Article III courts and the scope of and limitations on the treaty power. 
Additionally, nearly every argument made today about American 
exceptionalism in international law and about the conflict between 
domestic and international law was rehearsed nearly two hundred 
years ago.  America was accused abroad of xenophobia, arrogant ex-
ceptionalism, petty formalism, and indifference to massive human 
rights abuses.6  Domestically, there were arguments that the Constitu-
tion could not be interpreted in ways that would keep the country out 
of an emerging world order of international cooperation:  everyone 
else had joined the treaty, and the United States’ credibility as a hu-
man rights leader would be undermined if it did not participate.  Even 
the idea of “lawfare” was anticipated by Americans who claimed that 
Britain was simply using international law and humanitarian concerns 
as a cover to advance its own naval dominance.7  The slave-trade-courts 
episode thus shows current issues in a context removed from today’s 
political prejudices.8 
 
6 See, e.g., Matthew Mason, The Battle of the Slaveholding Liberators:  Great Britain, the 
United States, and Slavery in the Early Nineteenth Century, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 665, 671 
(2002) (describing how “American officials’ refusal to cooperate with Britain [in the 
right of search for slave-trade suppression] opened them to the charge of being sympa-
thetic to the African slave trade”). 
7 See Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams ( June 4, 1817) (calling the proposal for 
mutual search and capture of slave-trading vessels a “barefaced and impudent attempt 
of the British to obtain in time of peace that right of searching and seizing the ships of 
other nations which they have so outrageously abused during war”), in 3 MEMOIRS OF 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 555, 557 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippin-
cott & Co. 1874) [hereinafter ADAMS MEMOIRS]. 
8 It is not, however, free of past prejudices.  While repression of the slave trade, 
unlike domestic abolition, was broadly popular in America, cooperation with the Brit-
ish was not.  See infra text accompanying notes 85-98.  The Article will attempt to tease 
out the effects of these attitudes from the constitutional arguments.  See infra Part III. 
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While the U.S. delegation negotiating the Rome Treaty, the in-
strument establishing the ICC, took constitutional issues into ac-
count,9 it was unaware that an earlier international tribunal had been 
rejected on constitutional grounds.10  Indeed, the entire fifty-year epi-
sode is absent from the growing scholarly literature on international 
tribunals and non–Article III courts,11 as well as from historians’ dis-
cussions of American foreign relations and the slave trade.12  This 
omission is particularly significant because historical arguments—
arguments based on the precedent of the mixed commissions created 
by the Jay Treaty in 1794—underpin contemporary arguments in sup-
port of the constitutionality of international tribunals.13  As one lead-
 
9 See Scheffer & Cox, supra note 5, at 986 n.7 (noting that “[c]onstitutional issues 
were constantly considered”). 
10 See E-mail from David Scheffer to author (Sept. 7, 2009) (on file with author) 
(affirming that while serving as negotiator of the Rome Treaty on behalf of the United 
States, Scheffer did “not . . . recall the issue of the slave trade courts being raised”).   
11 The sole exception is a few paragraphs in Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., 
The Limits of Legitimacy:  The Rome Statute’s Unlawful Application to Non-State Parties, 44 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 63, 69-71 (2003).  While the authors view the rejection of the British slave-
court proposal as a precedent against the ICC, however, they do not analyze the consti-
tutional grounds for that rejection.  See id.  Moreover, the authors’ description of the 
proposal as concerning “only a civil jurisdiction,” id., might obscure the actual basis for 
the United States’ rejection.  See infra subsection V.A.2 (noting the agreement that in-
ternational criminal courts would be unconstitutional).   
12 For major works dealing with this period that neglect the episode, see DANIEL 
WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 
1815–1848 (2007); HOWARD JONES & DONALD A. RAKESTRAW, PROLOGUE TO MANIFEST 
DESTINY:  ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE 1840S, at 72-81 (1997); BRADFORD PER-
KINS, CASTLEREAGH AND ADAMS:  ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES, 1812–1823 
(1964); JAMES A. RAWLEY WITH STEPHEN D. BEHRENDT, THE TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE 
TRADE (rev. ed. 2005); HUGH G. SOULSBY, THE RIGHT OF SEARCH AND THE SLAVE 
TRADE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1814–1862, at 174-76 (1933).  While these his-
torians mention that the United States balked at the mixed commissions, they devote 
less than one page to the issue.  None discusses the nature or merits of the constitu-
tional objections. 
13 See HENKIN, supra note 5, at 266-70 (citing U.S. participation in a variety of 
mixed tribunals as evidence of the constitutionality of joining the ICC but not men-
tioning the United States’ rejection of the slave-court treaty); Diane Marie Amann & 
M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America and the International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. 
COMP. L. (SUPP.) 381, 382-85 (2002) (reviewing U.S. involvement in the development 
of international criminal adjudication); David Golove, The New Confederalism:  Treaty 
Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697, 1703-06 
(2003) (tracing the pre–Founding Era precedents for modern international organiza-
tions); Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and Supranational Judicial Review, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 833, 851-52 (2007) (“So far as practice can settle meaning, [the Jay Treaty] es-
tablishes that the United States can enter international agreements creating state-state 
arbitration panels to resolve the private law claims of its nationals against foreign gov-
ernments.”); Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 CO-
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ing legal historian put it, the precedent established by the Jay Treaty 
commission has gone “unchallenged.”14 
The only scholarship on the mixed courts examines the operation 
of the tribunals established by Britain with other nations; it does not 
examine the story of U.S. rejection.15  Professor Jenny Martinez has re-
cently argued that the antislavery courts can be seen as an encourag-
ing precedent for today’s international human rights tribunals.  Ac-
cording to Martinez, “the United States should consider . . . supporting 
stable international legal institutions” like the ICC.16  Given her con-
clusions, it is surprising that she skips past the constitutional grounds 
for America’s longstanding abstention from this international system.17 
Whatever one generally thinks of the relevance of historical prac-
tice to contemporary legal questions,18 history is particularly relevant 
here because it has been heavily invoked in arguments suggesting that 
U.S. participation in international courts is constitutional.19  More-
over, the history presented in this Article, unlike most history, is rele-
vant to a broad gamut of approaches to constitutional interpretation. 
 
LUM. L. REV. 1492, 1532 (2004) (arguing that nondelegation objections “must confront 
the longstanding practice of employing international arbitral tribunals”); Wedgwood, 
supra note 5; see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 50-51 (5th ed. Supp. 2008) (describing Mo-
naghan’s article as an “important contribution” whose “analysis rests largely on histori-
cal practice”). 
14 Golove, supra note 13, at 1746. 
15 See Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human 
Rights Law, 117 YALE L.J. 550, 579-95 (2008) (describing the antislavery courts that re-
sulted from bilateral treaties between Britain and other countries); see also Edward 
Keene, A Case Study of the Construction of International Hierarchy:  British Treaty-Making 
Against the Slave Trade in the Early Nineteenth Century, 61 INT’L ORG. 311, 312-15 (2007) 
(explaining the differences in the provisions of the treaties that Britain used to estab-
lish slave-trade tribunals with different nations). 
16 Martinez, supra note 15, at 640.  
17 See id. at 603 (mentioning President James Monroe’s constitutional objection in 
less than a sentence:  “Monroe . . . objected to the mixed courts as ‘incompatible’ with 
the Constitution . . . .”); see also Jenny S. Martinez, Slave Trade on Trial:  Lessons of a Great 
Human-Rights Law Success, BOSTON REV., Sept.–Oct. 2007, at 12, 15 (“Concerns about 
both sovereignty and freedom of the seas prevented [the United States] from joining 
the mixed-courts regime . . . .”). 
18 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in 
Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 579 (2000); David J. Beder-
man, Foreign Office International Legal History 2-8 (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 05-24, 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=756886 (discussing the kind of le-
gal historiography that makes for acceptable scholarship).   
19 See supra notes 13-14. 
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The events took place at the last twilight of the founding genera-
tion.20  A few Framers were among the key participants in the episode, 
and others were still in Congress.21  There is no clear originalist evi-
dence about the constitutionality of international criminal courts.  It 
might be in keeping with the spirit of originalism, however, to look at 
how the immediate successors of the Framers understood the ar-
rangements that the prior generation had made.  And these were not 
ordinary successors.  Indeed, John Quincy Adams, the central figure 
in the story, might be considered, like John Marshall, an honorary or 
quasi-member of the founding generation.22 
 
20 These events are too far from the Framing to be direct originalist evidence.  Le-
gal historians sometimes treat the entire period up to 1815 as part of the Founding 
Era.  See, e.g., Daniel Hulsebosch & David Golove, On an Equal Footing:  Constitution-
Making and the Law of Nations in the Early American Republic 50 (Mar. 15, 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript presented at the Alberico Gentili Conference, NYU), availa-
ble at  http://www.law.nyu.edu/search/ECM_DLV_016254 (referring to “the founding 
generation” as spanning “from 1776 to about 1815”).  This Article’s focus begins pre-
cisely where that period ends, with the Treaty of Ghent.   
21 The entire negotiation was presided over by James Monroe, who was the last 
Revolutionary War veteran elected President and who had been a member of the Con-
tinental Congress and the Virginia Ratifying Convention.  He personally approved 
Adams’s constitutional arguments.  See 2 DANIEL PRESTON, A COMPREHENSIVE CATA-
LOGUE OF THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PAPERS OF JAMES MONROE 734, 856, 888 (2001) 
(listing Monroe’s supervisory correspondence with Calhoun and Adams on the issue).  
Albert Gallatin, at the time Minister to France, advised the Administration on the trea-
ty.  He had been a member of the 1789 Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, which 
considered the first proposed amendments to the Constitution, and was one of the 
leading diplomats of the Founding Era.  See Biographical Directory of the U.S. Con-
gress, Gallatin, Albert, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000020 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2009).  Charles Pinckney, also a Framer, sat in the House from 1818 to 
1821.  Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress, Pinckney, Charles, http://bioguide. 
congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=P000354 (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).  Sitting in 
the Senate throughout the negotiations was Rufus King, one of the drafters of the Con-
stitution.  King had been ambassador to the Court of St. James and was involved with 
resolving the Jay Treaty controversies.  He was also a leading advocate of the gradual 
abolition of the slave trade and was extremely active from 1817 to 1820 in opposing the 
introduction of slavery to new states.  Cf. 6 THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS 
KING 90-95 (Charles R. King ed., 1900) [hereinafter KING].  Nevertheless, he vehe-
mently opposed the slave-trade convention because of the search issue.  See, e.g., PRES-
TON, supra, at 733 (noting a letter from King to James Monroe in which King voiced his 
opposition to the search proposal).  
22 Adams was not simply the son of a distinguished Framer.  Though he joined his 
father on diplomatic missions in the Revolutionary period, his participation in the po-
litical debates at the dawn of the Constitution led George Washington to appoint him 
as Minister to the Netherlands at the age of twenty-six and to other diplomatic posts in 
the 1790s.  See PAUL C. NAGEL, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS:  A PUBLIC LIFE, A PRIVATE LIFE 12-
13, 73-77 (1998).  These were not protocol posts for a scion of a powerful family:   
Adams was one of only five American ministers to foreign countries.  See id. at 82 (explain-
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For an adherent of the traditional lawyerly method, one who cares 
about the patina put on the Constitution by practice and usage, more 
than forty years of consistent interpretation cannot be easily dis-
missed.  Especially in the area of foreign relations, where judicial in-
terpretations are few and far between, the considered conduct of the 
political branches is the stuff of which law is made.  Finally, this history 
should speak to a pragmatic, policy-oriented view of the law.  The dip-
lomatic and human rights arguments made for and against U.S. par-
ticipation in the slave-trade courts are nearly identical to those made 
about the ICC today. 
Part I of this Article situates the debate over international courts 
as part of two broader constitutional debates—the scope of the treaty 
power and the permissibility of creating non–Article III courts.  Part II 
tells how, during James Monroe’s Administration, the United States 
rejected an intense diplomatic effort to persuade it to join a system of 
international courts concerned with the slave trade.  While Part II 
chronicles the back-and-forth of this diplomacy, Part III disentangles 
the legal arguments, elucidating and evaluating the constitutional 
grounds adduced for the refusal.  Part IV describes how in 1862, un-
der the pressure of the Civil War, the United States agreed, with some 
important qualifications, to the British proposal for a right of search 
and mixed courts.  Part V shows how even during the Civil War period 
there was generally agreement on the unconstitutionality of an inter-
national criminal court.  It synthesizes the constitutional lessons of the 
entire history of negotiations and shows how they apply to modern in-
ternational courts and to the ICC in particular.  Important arguments 
in support of the ICC, such as the similarity of its procedure to extra-
dition, are considered in light of the slave-trade-court precedent. 
I.  CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES 
This Part provides the background to the major constitutional de-
bates that converge in the question of international courts.  The nine-
teenth-century discussion of slave-trade courts reflects an approach to 
these questions that is surprisingly compatible with current constitu-
tional thinking despite the many changes in constitutional law that 
have since transpired.  A fuller understanding of these doctrines is 
needed, however, to better appreciate how these questions might have 
been viewed when they first arose in the early nineteenth century. 
 
ing that there were only U.S. embassies in London, Paris, Lisbon, Madrid, and The Ha-
gue).  Indeed, Adams was directly involved in negotiating the Jay Treaty.  Id. at 85-86, 90.  
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The first question is the extent to which Congress must use Article 
III courts.  International tribunals seem less objectionable if Congress 
can freely choose between assigning cases to Article III courts and 
other fora.  Secondly, there are questions about the extent to which 
the aforementioned constitutional rules apply when Congress is legis-
lating pursuant to a treaty.  Justice Holmes famously established in 
Missouri v. Holland that the treaty power is unencumbered by federal-
ism constraints.23  Yet treaties cannot override individual rights. 
A.  Non–Article III Courts 
Article III of the Constitution vests the federal judicial power in 
“one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.”24  The judges of these courts 
are appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate and hold 
their offices for life.  Nonetheless, Congress has, from near the begin-
ning of the Republic, allowed cases that fall within the scope of Article 
III to be heard by other types of tribunals in certain contexts.  The use 
of such non–Article III courts grew considerably in the twentieth cen-
tury as part of the rise of the administrative state.  Nonetheless, the 
cases countenancing non–Article III courts make clear that their use is 
subject to significant limitations.  They are not simply fungible substi-
tutes for Article III courts. 
1.  The Nineteenth Century:  Territorial, Military, and  
Consular Courts 
The First Congress gave jurisdiction over crimes and disciplinary 
violations by soldiers to courts martial headed by commissioned offic-
ers instead of federal judges.25  The constitutionality of these courts 
martial appears to have been taken for granted by the founding gen-
eration.  Indeed, courts martial were used throughout the Revolutio-
nary War and were assumed to carry over into the constitutional sys-
tem.26  Generally, military courts are understood as being quite 
separate from the civilian judicial system.  The Constitution often 
 
23 See 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (“It is obvious that there may be matters of the 
sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal 
with but that a treaty followed by such an act could . . . .”).   
24 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
25 See James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of 
the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 715-16 (2004). 
26 Id. 
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treats military matters as a unique category, and the applicable justice 
system is one of those matters. 
After the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, Congress established gov-
ernments for the newly acquired territories.  This involved creating a 
full set of courts, including courts for the trial of criminal offenses and 
courts for common law cases that would hear matters otherwise heard 
by state courts.  These courts were created outside of Article III, as 
were all future territorial courts.27 
The constitutionality of these courts was first upheld in American 
Insurance Co. v. Canter.28  Justice Marshall’s opinion did not suggest 
that Article III was optional.  Rather, Article III had no application to 
the particular case of territorial courts.29  The territorial courts largely 
decided local matters that would normally be handled by state courts.  
In the territories, Congress exercised the power of both state and fed-
eral governments.30  To the extent that Article III sought to govern the 
division of authority between state and federal courts, its policy was 
inapplicable in the context of territories.31 
Moreover, the territories were constituted with eventual statehood 
in mind.32  The temporary nature of territories is in obvious tension 
with the perpetual tenure of an Article III judge.  If all territorial 
judges were appointed under Article III, the transition to statehood 
would leave many of them with nothing to do because state courts, 
with their judges chosen by the people, would take over much of the 
territorial judges’ work.  Additionally, giving a judge on a small-claims 
court a lifetime-tenured position would undermine the prestige of the 
federal judiciary. 
An exception for “consular courts” in foreign countries was made 
in In re Ross.33  From the mid-1800s, the United States—following the 
lead of European countries—entered treaties with Muslim and Asian 
states that allowed U.S. diplomatic officials to mete out justice to 
Americans accused of crimes in those countries.  The purpose of these 
 
27 See id. at 749-54 (discussing the formation of territorial courts under Article I). 
28 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). 
29 Id. at 546. 
30 Id.  
31 The territorial-courts precedent was extended to the unincorporated territories 
in the Insular Cases.  See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904) (holding 
that the right to a jury trial, afforded in the states, did not apply in the territory of the 
Philippines).  Similarly, the precedent was applied to the District of Columbia in Pal-
more v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 402-05, 410 (1973). 
32 See Northwest Ordinance of 1787 § 13, reprinted in 1 U.S.C. at LVI (2006). 
33 140 U.S. 453 (1891). 
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deals was to insulate Americans from the harsh justice of those coun-
tries, but the effect was to allow executive officers to preside over the 
trials of Americans, without any procedural protections of constitu-
tional rights.  Ross upheld these arrangements34 in a broad holding 
that rested on three arguments:  First, the treaty power was not ca-
bined by other constitutional constraints.35  Second, the Constitution 
itself did not apply extraterritorially.36  Because there could be no Ar-
ticle III court for foreign territory, the consul did not usurp any U.S. 
judicial authority.37  Third, the defendant could not be prejudiced by 
a consular-court trial:  had the United States not entered into treaties 
with foreign countries allowing for such courts, American citizens 
would have been tried by local courts where they would have enjoyed 
far fewer rights and, indeed, been subject to cruel and inhuman 
treatment.38  Since it would not be unconstitutional for the United 
States to allow an American abroad to be tried in a foreign court, sure-
ly the United States could try him before an American non–Article III 
court—the greater would include the lesser.39 
One way of explaining these exceptions to the Article III norm 
looks to the underlying sources of congressional authority.  Argu-
ments for allowing non–Article III courts have stressed the plenary na-
ture of the powers given to Congress over the implementation of trea-
ties, the regulation of territories, the military, and the District of 
Columbia.  The absolute nature of congressional control in these con-
texts has suggested to the Court that some other constitutional con-
straints do not apply.  (Similarly, one might think that these powers 
are sources of authority alternate to the Inferior Tribunals Clause and 
thus not subject to its supremacy requirements.40)  This view is ques-
 
34 Id. at 480. 
35 See id. at 463 (“The treaty-making power vested in our government extends to all 
proper subjects of negotiation with foreign governments.”).   
36 Id. at 463-64. 
37 See id. at 464. 
38 Id. at 465. 
39 The case’s first and second points have since been overruled, and it is unlikely 
that consular courts would be found constitutional today.  See Boumediene v. Bush, 
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008) (“Even when the United States acts outside its borders, its 
powers are not absolute and unlimited but are subject to such restrictions as are ex-
pressed in the Constitution.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Reid v. Covert, 354 
U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion) (“[N]o agreement with a foreign nation can confer 
power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the 
restraints of the Constitution.”). 
40 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory . . . belonging to 
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tion-begging.  Congress also has plenary power over foreign com-
merce, but cases arising from the exercise of that power are not free 
from Article III. 
2.  The Twentieth Century:  Administrative Courts and Public Rights 
The Supreme Court has attempted to infer limitations on the use 
of non–Article III courts by examining situations in the early Republic 
where such courts were used, as well as general structural considera-
tions.  Unfortunately, this approach has led to the subject’s notoriety 
as one of the most “vexed and confusing subjects in federal law.”41  
Examining the nineteenth-century precedents begs the question of 
whether uses of non–Article III courts were isolated exceptions, made 
in “extraordinary situations,” to the general rule of Article III supre-
macy or whether they were evidence of a broader rule—that Congress 
could create courts outside Article III when it wanted to.42 
The twentieth-century cases are a mess, alternately reflecting the 
mandatory and permissive views of Article III.  Crowell v. Benson estab-
lished the basic constitutionality of using administrative courts to de-
termine cases in the first instance.43  The Court drew what would be-
come an important distinction between so-called public and private 
rights:  The former involve claims against the United States for money 
and certain civil regulatory actions, such as customs enforcement, 
brought by the United States.  Private rights, by contrast, include any-
thing that looks like a classic common law right, as well as criminal 
prosecutions.44  The distinction between public and private rights is 
not always clear, and it has been subject to serious criticism.45 
 
the United States . . . .”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To 
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces . . . .”); 
id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To exercise exclusive Legisla-
tion in all Cases whatsoever . . . over . . . the Seat of the Government . . . .”). 
41 McGinnis, supra note 3, at 1726. 
42 See DAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 53 (4th ed. 1999) 
(“Thus the Congress, in exercising the powers confided to it, may establish ‘legislative’ 
courts . . . .”). 
43 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932). 
44 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 n.24 
(1982) (plurality opinion) (noting that criminal prosecutions have always been treated 
as “private rights” cases). 
45 See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER:  
JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 93-94 (1991) (calling the 
goal of limiting judicial power to cases of private rights “absurd”). 
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Perhaps because public rights do not involve the kind of matters 
for which one would traditionally be entitled to any kind of hearing, 
Congress can apparently entrust them to Article I tribunals.46  Private 
rights, on the other hand, can only be delegated to non–Article III 
tribunals under very limited circumstances.  Such delegations general-
ly involve narrow and technical questions in the context of a detailed, 
overarching regulatory scheme.47  Even “core” common law claims can 
be taken away piecemeal from federal courts as long as the removal is 
motivated by administrative and technical concerns rather than a de-
sire to find a forum more sympathetic to congressional policy.48 
Other cases have taken a more absolutist view of the Article III re-
quirement.  Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 
held that public rights, territorial courts, and military courts were nar-
row, context-specific exceptions to Article III exclusivity rather than 
evidence that Congress may make courts outside of Article III when-
ever it so desires.49  Northern Pipeline thus struck down provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Act that allowed non–Article III bankruptcy judges to de-
cide all state law claims involving an estate.50  Similarly, private-rights 
cases will often require a jury under the Seventh Amendment, and the 
Court has held that, even when Congress can take such cases away 
from the federal courts, Congress cannot take them away from a fed-
eral jury.51  Because legislative tribunals invariably operate without a 
jury trial, the Seventh Amendment consideration greatly limits Con-
gress’s ability to give Article I tribunals classic private-rights cases even 
when Article III does not pose a barrier. 
Yet the Article III absolutism of Northern Pipeline was quickly li-
mited by Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, which allowed 
a regulatory agency to decide a limited class of common law contract 
claims arising out of the same transaction as those regulatory claims 
that the agency was created to hear.52  Congress’s goal of promoting 
 
46 Cf. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50; FALLON ET AL., supra note 13, at 49 (referring to 
Pfander’s argument that non–Article III tribunals have historically had as their subject 
matter disputes that lie outside the jurisdiction of Article III courts). 
47 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-57 
(1986) (finding that the grant of jurisdiction over certain common law counterclaims 
to the non–Article III Commodity Futures Trading Commission did not violate the 
Constitution). 
48 See id. at 853-55. 
49 See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70-71. 
50 Id. at 84-87. 
51 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 61-64 (1989). 
52 See Schor, 478 U.S. at 837, 857. 
17 KONTOROVICH FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2009  12:24 PM 
54 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 39 
administrative convenience and the limited scope of jurisdiction—the 
Court described the damage to Article III values as “de minimis”—
were crucial to the decision.53  Thus, Northern Pipeline seems to contra-
dict much of Crowell, but Schor rejects Northern Pipeline. 
3.  The Availability of Article III Review 
Even in the confused non–Article III court jurisprudence, some 
things remain clear.  The acceptability of legislative courts for any-
thing other than pure public rights is premised on the availability of 
appeal to an Article III court, especially for constitutional and jurisdic-
tional questions.54  If appellate review is possible, the issue has not 
been entirely withdrawn from “[t]he judicial power of the United 
States,”55 greatly reducing Article III problems.  Indeed, almost all fed-
eral issues can be determined in the first instance by state courts, 
which lack any Article III features.  Yet these courts are reviewable by 
the Supreme Court.  This suggests that Article III is satisfied if the judi-
cial power extends to the federal question, at least in appellate form. 
With one small exception, Congress has always made decisions by 
civilian non–Article III judges reviewable by and subordinate to those 
of their life-tenured counterparts.56  Starting with the courts estab-
lished for the Louisiana and Mississippi territories in 1804 and 1805, 
all territorial-court systems were reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court 
on roughly the same terms as district or state supreme courts—i.e., for 
federal-question issues, not purely local ones.57  The one exception 
was the first territorial-court system, which was established for the 
Northwest Territory; Congress did not provide for Supreme Court re-
view of these courts’ decisions, largely because it would be impractical 
 
53 See id. at 856. 
54 See id. at 853 (observing that the legal rulings of the administrative courts were 
still subject to de novo review by Article III courts); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 44 
(1932) (noting that parties could seek suspension of the legislative-court order by insti-
tuting proceedings in a federal district court). 
55
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.   
56 See William Wirt Blume & Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, Territorial Courts and Law:  
Unifying Factors in the Development of American Legal Institutions (pt. 1), 61 MICH. L. REV. 
39, 75-78 (1962) (discussing appellate review of nineteenth-century territorial courts).  
57 Similarly, the D.C. courts, though created by Congress, are not reviewable on 
local issues.  See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 396, 407-10 (1973) (holding 
that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal regarding a “strict-
ly local crime”). 
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given the difficulties of travel to Washington.58  The Court apparently 
upheld this severe limitation on Article III review and its own supre-
macy in a cryptic one-sentence opinion in the early case of Clarke v. 
Bazadone.59  Yet even this decision left open the possibility of habeas 
review in cases of detention and the possibility of other supervisory 
writs.60  In short, there is no precedent for the creation of permanent 
civilian courts to which the Supreme Court’s writ does not run.61 
 B.  Non–Article III Juries 
In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, the Court approached the Ar-
ticle III issue from another angle, suggesting that while there may not 
always be a right to an Article III judge, use of a non–Article III tribun-
al does not suspend the Seventh Amendment right to a jury in civil 
suits.62  Presumably the same would be said about the Sixth Amendment 
 
58 See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 42, § 4, 1 Stat. 285, 286 (providing that one Supreme 
or Superior judge of the territories could hold court).  This eliminated all direct re-
view, but habeas may still have been a possibility in criminal cases.  See Clarke v. Baza-
done, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 212, 212-14 (1803) (quashing an appeal from a Northwest 
Territory court on the ground that Congress had not authorized such jurisdiction, de-
spite arguments by George Mason that the Supreme Court’s status as “supreme” and 
the mandatory language of Article III, Section 2 regarding appellate jurisdiction gave 
the Court inherent authority to supervise and correct all other courts, independent of 
any act of Congress).  Clarke was issued one week before Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137 (1803), though it appears subsequently in the United States Reports.  
See ANNE ASHMORE, LIBRARY, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., DATES OF SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS:  UNITED STATES REPORTS, VOLUMES 2–107, AUGUST TERM 1791–
OCTOBER TERM 1882, at 4 (1997), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
datesofdecisions.pdf.  Thus, depending on how well established one thinks judicial 
review was before Marbury, Clarke can be understood as implying that the Court must 
accept Congress’s jurisdictional allocations even if they are unconstitutional.  After 
Clarke, Congress did not exempt any territorial court from appeal.  See also Blume & 
Brown, supra note 56, at 78 (describing Congress’s concern with the territorial-court 
appeal issue as focused on attaining uniform decisionmaking). 
59 The case held that there was no statutory basis for issuing a writ of error to the 
territorial court.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 214. 
60 Perhaps such writs as those of habeas and mandamus, which had independent 
statutory and, in the case of habeas, constitutional, sources could still be issued.  Cf. 
Pfander, supra note 25, at 724-27 (describing such common law writs as important to 
maintaining supervisory control over lower tribunals, including tribunals outside Ar-
ticle III). 
61 Military courts have always been an exception.  Even today, many criminal cases 
adjudicated by a court martial are not reviewable by any Article III court.  See Bernie 
Becker, Military Appeal Process Is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, at A30 (describ-
ing a bill approved by the House but still pending in Congress that would allow Su-
preme Court review of all courts martial). 
62 492 U.S. 33, 64 (1989). 
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right to a jury in criminal cases.  Because non–Article III courts lack ju-
ries, Granfinanciera may have practical implications quite similar to the 
mandatory view of Article III in Northern Pipeline.  Since the jury-trial 
right only applies to criminal and common law cases, the Granfinanciera 
limitation also has echoes of the private-rights criterion. 
The courts for Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida, as well as for the 
territories acquired from Spain one hundred years later, did not feature 
juries.  The Supreme Court upheld this arrangement because there was 
no history of juries in these places.63  Perhaps the people were not ac-
customed to or prepared for jury service and would not expect the ben-
efit of a jury.  Like territorial courts themselves, the exception was ex-
plicitly temporary, until American legal norms permeated the new 
territories.64  Military courts also lack juries, though trial by a panel of 
officers substitutes.65  When it comes to jury trials, the early territorial 
courts and courts martial are invariably regarded as atypical pockets ra-
ther than an illustration that the Sixth Amendment is optional or sub-
ject to a balancing test.66 
 C.  International Courts 
The treaty power allows for arrangements unencumbered by the 
limitations of enumerated powers and federalism, as evidenced by the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Missouri v. Holland.67  However, treaties 
are not entirely immune from constitutional constraint.  For example, 
legislation pursuant to treaties cannot negate individual rights guaran-
teed in the Bill of Rights,68 and perhaps by extension other express in-
dividual rights, protections, or limitations on governmental power.  
 
63 Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1904). 
64 Id. 
65 Pfander, supra note 25, at 716-17. 
66 Yet supporters of joining the ICC argue that these precedents show that even 
civilians can be tried for conduct that took place in the United States proper.  See, e.g., 
Scheffer & Cox, supra note 5, at 1041-47. 
67 See 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920) (explaining that legislation implementing a 
treaty is not limited by Tenth Amendment concerns and need not be justified by a sep-
arate Article I power).   
68 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion) (“[N]o agreement 
with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch 
. . . which is free from the restraints of the Constitution.”); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 
U.S. 312, 324 (1988) (noting that rules of international law do not trump the Bill of 
Rights); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
390, 412 (1998) (arguing that there is no indication that the Framers intended to ex-
empt the treaty power from the general proposition that the powers delegated to the 
national government are limited and few). 
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The precise limits remain unclear.69  Thus, whether constitutional ob-
jections to international courts can be avoided through the treaty 
power depends heavily on the nature of those objections. 
Much of the precedent for the view that the treaty power allows 
for the creation of international tribunals independent of the Su-
preme Court stems from the commission created by the Jay Treaty of 
1794.70  Subsequently, extensive use was made of bilateral mixed arbi-
tral commissions to liquidate disputes between the United States and 
another country as part of a diplomatic reconciliation.71  The Jay Trea-
ty commissions could only hear claims against the British and U.S. 
governments, which had undertaken to compensate outstanding cred-
itors from both sides and thus to remove an enduring source of fric-
tion.72  These claims were “public rights.”  Claimants had no common 
law right to compensation from the countries themselves; the right 
was only granted by the treaty.  Their right was only to pursue private 
claims in regular courts, because the money was not owed by the gov-
ernments.  Even if the money had been owed by the governments, 
suits would have been barred by sovereign immunity.  Thus, from the 
perspective of the private American parties affected by the treaty—
 
69 The debate goes back to the Founding Era.  See John T. Parry, Congress, the Su-
premacy Clause, and the Implementation of Treaties, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1209, 1211-12 
(2009) (stating that there was “a lack of consensus [and] also considerable confusion 
about how the treaty power, legislative powers, and supremacy clause would interact 
under the new Constitution”).  There are also notable recent contributions.  Compare 
Bradley, supra note 68, at 394-95 (arguing that the treaty power should not be con-
strued so as to negate federalism), and Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty 
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 (2005) (contending that Missouri v. Holland was wrongly 
decided), with David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation:  The Historical Foundations 
of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1079 (2000) 
(maintaining that Missouri v. Holland was correctly decided), and David Sloss, Interna-
tional Agreements and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1963, 1975-88 
(2003) (positing that federalism limitations need not be imposed on the treaty power). 
70 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 
Stat. 116 [hereinafter Jay Treaty]. 
71 These tribunals have always had narrow purviews.  For example, the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal, created in 1981 and based in The Hague, has purely retrospec-
tive jurisdiction over contract and property claims by U.S. nationals against Iran and its 
entities.  See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 664-66 (1981) (describing the 
creation of the Claims Tribunal). 
72 The commission established by Article VI of the Jay Treaty is certainly a very dis-
couraging precedent.  It had only one ignoble session, in which it decided nothing.  
The American commissioners were disappointed that the tie-breaking moderator, cho-
sen by lot in case of a deadlock, was British.  The Americans withdrew from the pro-
ceedings, defeating a quorum.  See SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY’S TREATY:  A STUDY IN 
COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY app. V, at 318 (1923). 
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parties who would have otherwise been limited to suing in British 
courts—one group of non–Article III judges was replaced by another.73 
Aside from such commissions, there has been little occasion to 
consider the extent to which participation in international tribunals 
might infringe upon constitutional principles because the United States 
has not joined such tribunals.74  The debate began in earnest only in 
the 1990s with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), which allows certain U.S. administrative decisions to 
be challenged before a binational commission.  Previously, these mat-
ters would have been heard by Article III courts, which now have very 
limited authority to review the rulings of the binational panels.75 
II.  THE REJECTION OF MIXED COURTS 
This Part describes America’s longstanding refusal to join an in-
ternational network dealing with slave trading on the high seas.  The 
focus here is the diplomatic history of the refusal; the subsequent Part 
explores the legal arguments.  The understanding that joining such a 
system would be unconstitutional was apparently unanimous in the 
first half of the nineteenth century. 
Starting in 1817, Britain entered treaties with numerous countries 
establishing international courts for the slave trade.76  Nevertheless, 
the United States maintained that the Constitution categorically for-
bade trying American citizens before such tribunals, which were com-
 
73 This presages the “greater includes the lesser” reasoning employed in In re Ross.  
See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text. 
74 The United States signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
but neither the Clinton nor the Bush Administration pursued ratification.  In fact, 
President George W. Bush removed the United States’ signature from the treaty, pro-
voking an outpouring of criticism from international lawyers in Europe and America.  
See David Tolbert, International Criminal Law:  Past and Future, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1281, 
1289 (2009). 
75 Constitutional challenges to NAFTA tribunals remain unresolved.  See, e.g., Coal. 
for Fair Lumber Imps., Executive Comm. v. United States, 471 F.3d 1329, 1332-33 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (ruling that a U.S.-Canadian settlement agreement pre-
cluded review of a panel ruling); Am. Coal. for Competitive Trade v. Clinton, 128 F.3d 
761, 764-65 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (dismissing a suit for lack of standing where the petitioner 
“failed to establish the requisite causal connection between its alleged injury and the 
binational panel system”).  
76 See Martinez, supra note 15, at 552-53 (“Between 1817 and 1871, bilateral treaties 
between Britain and several other countries . . . led to the establishment of international 
courts for the suppression of the slave trade. . . . [They] involved as many as one out of 
every five or six ships involved in the transatlantic slave trade.” (footnote omitted)). 
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posed of one judge from each country.77  The mixed-courts proposal 
was part of a broader initiative under which countries agreed to allow 
their merchant ships to be searched on the high seas for evidence of 
participation in the slave trade.  Vessels seized for involvement in the 
trade were brought before the mixed courts.78 
Most of the relevant discussions between the United States and 
Britain took place between 1818, when a treaty was formally proposed, 
and 1824, when efforts to achieve a more modest treaty broke down 
amidst British allegations of bad faith.  While Britain imposed mixed-
courts treaties on other countries over the subsequent decades—and 
continued to hold out hope, at a minimum, for a search treaty with 
the United States—mixed commissions were off the table.79 
By happenstance, John Quincy Adams played a central role in the 
American response at every stage:  he served as Minister to Britain 
when the slave-trade courts were first conceived, as Secretary of State 
during the most active period of negotiations, and ultimately as the 
President who supervised the negotiations to their unsuccessful con-
clusion.80  He played the largest role in formulating the constitutional 
objections to the British project. 
Adams’s centrality is fortunate for historical purposes.  First, his 
diaries are among the most meticulous of any statesman of the time.81  
They provide the most thorough record of the considerations in-
volved in the slave-courts matter.  Second, he was (and still is) re-
garded as a man of extraordinary intellect and learning, easily the 
most brilliant statesman of the time, and a serious scholar of the Con-
 
77 See id. at 579, 603-04 (explaining that President Monroe rejected international 
courts as disallowed by the Constitution). 
78 See id. at 582. 
79 See Leslie Bethell, The Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of the Transatlantic 
Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century, 7 J. AFR. HIST. 79, 82-83 (1966) (describing Lord 
Palmerston’s policy of expanding the anti-slave-trade treaty network and describing its 
success with every nation except the United States and France); see also THE FOREIGN 
SLAVE TRADE:  A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF ITS STATE, OF THE TREATIES WHICH HAVE BEEN 
ENTERED INTO, AND OF THE LAWS ENACTED FOR ITS SUPPRESSION, FROM THE DATE OF 
THE ENGLISH ABOLITION ACT TO THE PRESENT TIME 20 (London, John Hatchard & 
Son et al. 1837) (bemoaning, with some exaggeration, the U.S. rejection “[y]ear after 
year” of “advances made by this country for a treaty for affording mutual facilities”). 
80 Additionally, Adams’s son, Charles Francis Adams, would later be the American 
envoy to the Court of St. James, when, under the pressure of the Civil War, the United 
States ultimately acceded to such a treaty.  See infra Part IV (describing the circum-
stances surrounding the United States’ accession). 
81 See HOWE, supra note 12, at 245 (describing Adams’s devotion to self-
improvement by setting aside time every day for diary writing). 
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stitution.82  Adams was also a lifelong enemy of slavery.  While in the 
Executive, he did not favor radical restrictions on slavery.  He became 
more active, though, when he sat in the House of Representatives in 
the 1830s and 1840s.  Indeed, he was a leading sponsor of petitions to 
abolish the slave trade in the District of Columbia, which earned him 
the wrath of his fellow Southerners and made him an early target of 
the gag rule.83  Most famously, he defended in the Supreme Court the 
slaves on board the Amistad who took over the ship that was transport-
ing them after killing the officers and many of the crewmembers.84 
A.  The Campaign Against the Slave Trade 
In the early 1800s, a powerful movement to abolish the transatlan-
tic slave trade arose in England and America.  By 1815, a majority of 
Americans had come to regard slavery as evil, though many still 
thought it necessary or feared the social dislocations that emancipa-
tion could cause.85  Opposition to the slave trade was even stronger, 
based in part on a growing awareness across society of the massive 
death toll and great cruelty of the Middle Passage.86  Measures against 
the transatlantic trade had broad support in Congress into the 1830s. 
The issue of the transatlantic slave trade was quite distinct from 
the issue of domestic slavery.  Abolition did not emerge as a significant 
movement until the 1830s, sparked in part by the Nat Turner revolt 
and South Carolina’s nullification efforts in 1829–1830.87  Until then, 
measures to restrict the slave trade enjoyed the support of a robust 
“Baptists and bootleggers” coalition comprised of Quakers, other 
moral critics of slavery, as well as slave owners who did not wish to see 
the prices of their “property” undercut.  Moreover, like the project to 
colonize Africa with freed slaves, ending the trade was seen by mod-
erate Southerners as a way to gradually mitigate the evils of slavery 
without implementing radical changes.88  Indeed, Southerners were 
among the most vocal proponents of abolishing the transatlantic 
 
82 See id. at 244-45. 
83 See id. at 512, 514. 
84 See id. at 521-22. 
85 See id. at 53. 
86 See id. at 51-52. 
87 For example, the New England Anti-Slavery Society first met in 1833, and the 
American Anti-Slavery Society, the most prominent American abolitionist group, 
formed over the next few years.  Id. at 426. 
88 See id. at 254. 
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trade; the most prominent opponents of mixed courts were figures 
with impeccable antislavery credentials. 
Thus, one cannot consider the proposed courts victims of the 
Slave Power.  (Nothing in the discussions under the Monroe and 
Adams Administrations betrays any concern that the proposal was part 
of a creeping abolitionism.)  Southerners only began to perceive a 
connection between the movement against the slave trade and aboli-
tion more generally in the 1840s or 1850s, as they increasingly bristled 
at any Northern interest in their “peculiar institution.”  From that 
point on, but not before, opposition to slave-trade courts in at least 
some sectors was difficult to disentangle from opposition to any initia-
tives implicitly critical of slavery. 
In the United States, a ban on the importation of slaves went into 
effect in 1808, the earliest date permitted by the Constitution.89  In 
1820, the United States enacted the world’s most draconian anti-slave-
trade legislation, declaring the slave trade a form of “piracy,” punisha-
ble by death.90  The statute applied to “any citizen of the United 
States” engaged in the slave trade on any foreign vessel as well as “any 
person whatever” engaged in the slave trade on a vessel “owned in the 
whole or part . . . [by] any citizen or citizens of the United States.”91 
At the same time, European powers, though slower to legislate 
against the slave trade, had begun to denounce it.  Britain was the un-
disputed leader of this movement, banning the trade throughout its 
dominions in 1807.92  After that, it was eager to see other nations ac-
cept the same restriction; otherwise, Britain’s rivals would gain a com-
petitive advantage by using cheap slave labor in their colonies.  It be-
gan to use its formidable diplomatic clout to push for an international 
slave-trade ban and comprehensive methods of enforcement.93  At the 
Congress of Vienna, held at the end of the Napoleonic wars, Britain 
secured an international resolution condemning the slave trade.94  
While Lord Castlereagh, the foreign minister, pushed for more robust 
 
89 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons 
as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by 
the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight . . . .”); Act of 
Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (prohibiting the importation of people of color as 
slaves after January 1, 1808). 
90 See Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, §§ 4–5, 3 Stat. 600, 600-01; see also infra Sec-
tion II.D. 
91 §§ 4–5, 3 Stat. at 600-01. 
92 See Bethell, supra note 79, at 79. 
93 See id. 
94 See Martinez, supra note 15, at 574. 
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measures there and at the Congress of Verona shortly thereafter, he 
only received another nonbinding declaration.95  In the coming years, 
Britain would push doggedly to get all other nations, one by one, to 
ban the slave trade. 
B.  Rejecting the Mixed-Courts Proposal 
Britain first proposed an international-justice mechanism for slave 
traders during the negotiation of the Treaty of Ghent, which ended 
the War of 1812.  In the proposed treaty, both countries would dec-
lare the trade to be piracy.96  This would allow suspects from either na-
tion to be tried in the courts of the other.97  The American delegation 
promptly rejected the proposal.98  One commissioner, James Bayard, 
argued that because of piracy’s unique jurisdictional consequences—
piracy was the only offense to which universal jurisdiction had ever 
applied—“a nation might, if it pleased, make any . . . act of its own 
subjects punishable as piracy by its own Courts, but no nation, and no 
two nations, could make that piracy which is not recognized as such by 
other nations.”99  Albert Gallatin retorted that such treaties would not 
actually make the slave trade universally cognizable but only “assimi-
late” the new offense to piracy, just like the statutes of which Bayard 
spoke.100 
Around the same time, the British began advocating a system of 
international courts.  In a December 1816 conversation with John 
Quincy Adams, then the U.S. envoy in London, Lord Castlereagh first 
broached the possibility of American participation.  Any nation enter-
ing into the system would give the other nations the right to search its 
merchant vessels.  As to those caught on suspicion of slave trading, 
Castlereagh proposed that 
trial should be by Commissioners not exclusively of the capturing nation; 
that each of the powers . . . appoint one “Commissaire Juge,” and that 
whenever a capture was made it should be tried by the Commissary 
Judge of the capturing nation and one of the nation, under whose flag 
 
95 See id. at 574-75. 
96 See Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Dec. 10, 1814) (stating that, under the 
proposed treaty, slave trading “should be assimilated to piracy and it should be agreed 
to punish the offenders as pirates”), in ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 7, at 93, 96-97. 
97 See id. (“[T]he [c]ourts of justice should be open in each of the two countries to 
the subjects and citizens of the other.”). 
98 See id. at 97-98 (noting that Bayard, Adams, and Clay opposed the idea). 
99 Id. at 97. 
100 Id. 
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the slave-trading vessel should be taken, and, if they could not agree, 
then to call in the Commissaire Juge of a third and indifferent party to 
decide.
101
 
Adams thought the suggestion was a trial balloon and let it float away. 
Britain had greater success in bringing other countries on board.  
In 1817, Holland and Spain signed treaties providing for mixed tri-
bunals, and negotiations with several other countries were under way.  
Having more support for the plan, Castlereagh broached it again with 
Richard Rush, Adams’s successor in London, at the beginning of 
1818.  He formally invited the United States to join such a treaty on 
June 20, 1818.102  Castlereagh elaborated upon the vast evil of the 
trade, a point with which Rush and most of the Administration cer-
tainly agreed.  International cooperation was needed to bring it to an 
end, he argued.  Rush was sympathetic and wrote to Washington for 
instructions.103 
The Cabinet met on October 20, 1818, to discuss the proposal and 
rejected it in its entirety.104  The discussion focused on the right of 
search.  The search issue was political dynamite in America because of 
its association with impressment—a practice where U.S. ships were 
stopped and “searched” for British seamen—over which the War of 
1812 had just been fought.  Britain’s ongoing claim of a right to 
search in that context remained a top diplomatic priority and a source 
of intense national resentment.  Thus, at the Cabinet meeting and 
subsequently, the search proposal dominated all discussions of the 
proposed treaty, both because of its intense emotional resonance and 
because the mixed courts were a logically subsequent issue.  The 
courts would have no docket in the absence of mutual search. 
Nonetheless, the mixed commissions were raised and opposed at 
the Cabinet meeting.  While the search proposal was openly objected 
to for policy and emotional reasons, the problem with the mixed 
courts was constitutional—though the two most prominent members 
 
101 Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Dec. 23, 1816), in ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra 
note 7,  at 452, 454-55. 
102 See RICHARD RUSH, MEMORANDA OF A RESIDENCE AT THE COURT OF LONDON 32-
36 (Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard 1845) (describing and reprinting Castlereagh’s let-
ter to Rush inviting the United States to join the treaty). 
103 See id. at 39. 
104 See Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 30, 1818) (“The opinion was un-
animous that this proposal ought not to be acceded to.”), in 4 MEMOIRS OF JOHN 
QUINCY ADAMS 148, 151 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & 
Co. 1875) [hereinafter ADAMS MEMOIRS]. 
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of the Cabinet differed as to the constitutional defect.105  Attorney 
General William Wirt106 took the lead in arguing that “there was no 
constitutional authority in the Government of the United States to es-
tablish” such a court.107  He offered several structural and nondelega-
tion objections.108  Because the Constitution made no mention of such 
an exotic hybrid tribunal, he apparently thought Congress was without 
power to create it.  Adams rejected this reasoning, citing the 
precedent of the Jay Treaty commission and the broad scope of the 
treaty power.  However, at the end of the meeting, the Cabinet voted 
unanimously against the proposal.  Adams wrote Rush that the Ad-
ministration viewed the mixed courts as unconstitutional because of 
the nondelegation issues raised by Wirt.109 
C.  Not Taking “No” for an Answer 
Rush met with Castlereagh to outline the Administration’s objec-
tions.  The Foreign Minister was apparently surprised by the constitu-
tional obstacle.  Rush, however, reminded him that Britain had re-
cently refused to enter the Holy Alliance—an early attempt at a 
European union among the victors of the Napoleonic wars—because 
of constitutional scruples.110  As Rush tells it, the point scored home:  
Castlereagh “candidly admitted that we, too, doubtless had our consti-
tutional embarrassments” that would have to be overcome “by proper 
modifications of the plan.”111  Seeing the depth of the Administra-
tion’s opposition, Castlereagh decided to transfer the negotiations to 
 
105 For a thorough examination of the Cabinet’s precise constitutional objections, 
see infra Part III. 
106 Wirt was the longest-serving and most influential Attorney General in the na-
tion’s history—serving for twelve years.  Through his prolific use of opinion letters, he 
defined the office’s paramount role in setting a consistent legal policy for an adminis-
tration.  See generally Henry M. Dowling, William Wirt, 10 GREEN BAG 453 (1898) (profil-
ing Wirt); H. Jefferson Powell, William Wirt & the Invention of the Public Lawyer, 4 GREEN 
BAG 2D 297 (2001) (discussing Wirt’s aspirations and impact on legal policy). 
107 Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams, supra note 104. 
108 See infra notes 165-72 and accompanying text. 
109 See Letter from John Quincy Adams to Albert Gallatin and Richard Rush (Nov. 
2, 1818), as reprinted in 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:  FOREIGN RELATIONS 72, 72-73 (As-
bury Dickins & James C. Allen eds., Washington, D.C., Gales & Seaton 1858) [hereinaf-
ter AMERICAN STATE PAPERS].  
110 See RUSH, supra note 102, at 215 (“I adverted to what Liverpool said[,] . . . that 
as the signatures of European Sovereigns to the Holy Alliance were all by their own 
hands, England could not join in it, as the Prince Regent was restrained, by the fun-
damental doctrine of the British constitution.”). 
111 Letter from Richard Rush to John Quincy Adams (Nov. 10, 1819), as reprinted in 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 109, at 74, 75.  
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Washington, where they would be conducted by Stafford Canning, the 
new British ambassador.112 
1.  A Second Cabinet Meeting 
The British were relentless in their efforts to secure U.S. participa-
tion.  In 1819 and 1820, the British, usually in the person of Canning, 
pressed the subject at every opportunity in a series of meetings with 
Adams.113  In these animated discussions, Canning argued that other 
European powers had joined such treaties without any objections.114  
Canning hinted that America’s refusal of a plan agreed upon by Eu-
rope could be seen as a “general . . . refusal to co-operate with them in 
any measure.”115  He also elaborated on the evils of the slave trade:  
would the United States not live up to its stated commitment to hu-
man rights?  In reply, Adams repeatedly insisted that the right of 
search was politically untouchable and that the mixed commissions 
were legally so.  He stressed the “incompatibility of such tribunals with 
the essential character of the constitutional rights guarantied [sic] to 
every citizen of the Union.”116  The constitutional arguments were re-
hashed repeatedly, to the point of straining Adams’s patience.117 
 
112 Proclamation of President James Monroe ( Jan. 26, 1823), in AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS, supra note 109, at 214, 214-15. 
113 See Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Apr. 14, 1819) (recounting a meeting 
with the British ambassador, Mr. Bagot, during which Adams referred to the non-
impeachability of the judges as a constitutional objection), in ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra 
note 104, at 333, 335; Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 2, 1820) (describing a 
two-hour conversation with Canning), in 5 ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 104, at 181, 
181-82; Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 20, 1820) (recording a three-hour 
discussion), in 5 ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 104, at 189, 189; Diary Entry of John 
Quincy Adams (Oct. 26, 1820) (describing a two-hour discussion), in 5 ADAMS ME-
MOIRS, supra note 104, at 191-93; Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Dec. 18, 1820) 
(recounting another long meeting), in 5 ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 104, at 212, 214.  
Each of these conversations dealt extensively with the constitutional issues. 
114 See Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 2, 1820), supra note 113, at 182, 
184.  To this, Adams replied that broad European participation only strengthened his 
desire to stay out of the treaties, as the United States did not want to become entan-
gled in the arrangements of a federative Europe.  Id. at 182.  
115 Id. at 183. 
116 Letter from John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning (Dec. 30, 1820), in 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 109, at 76, 76. 
117 See Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 26, 1820), supra note 113, at 192-93 
(“I told him that it was not my wish to debate the point.  We had more than once ex-
hausted the argument with his Government . . . .”). 
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After these fruitless discussions, Canning prevailed upon Adams to 
put the question to the Cabinet again.118  Surprisingly, Monroe agreed, 
and the Cabinet revisited the issue on December 23, 1820.119  Again, 
much of the discussion focused on the right of search.120  This time 
Adams did not repeat his earlier defense of the commissions.  Rather, 
“[t]he opinion was unanimous . . . that it would be repugnant to the 
article in the Constitution concerning the organization of the judicial 
power.”121  Adams might have voted with the Cabinet to avoid revising 
a settled position—or he may have come to see the proposal as un-
constitutional on other grounds.122 
2.  Trading Canada for Commissions? 
The campaign against the slave trade was a key part of British for-
eign policy.  America’s refusal to join the search treaties frustrated the 
goal of universal participation by maritime powers.  Thus London, de-
spite the initial rebuffs, continued over the next several years to press 
for the United States to join the mixed-courts regime.  Adams com-
plained that Britain was “using every exertion with unwearied impor-
tunity to obtain the assent to it of all the great European powers and 
of the United States.”123 
 
118 Cf. Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Dec. 18, 1820) (describing Canning’s 
urgings to Adams to have the President reconsider the proposal), supra note 113, at 214. 
119
Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Dec. 23, 1820), in 5 ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra 
note 104, at 216.  The Cabinet met yet again one week later to approve the text of 
Adams’s memorandum to Canning on the subject; again, there was consensus that the 
courts were unconstitutional.  See Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Dec. 30, 1820) 
(“[M]y draft of an answer to Mr. Canning . . . was approved, with the suggestion of 
some slight alterations . . . to soften the harshness of refusal.”), in 5 ADAMS MEMOIRS, 
supra note 104, at 222, 222. 
120 Only Secretary of the Navy Smith Thompson favored the search provision.  
Thompson had previously been Chief Justice of the New York Supreme Court.  He 
thought the search for slavers was a specific enough question that it would not serve as 
precedent for impressment but that “by declining [the search provision] we shall ex-
pose ourselves to the imputation of insincerity as to our purpose of suppressing the 
trade,” which would “discredit us with the rest of Europe.”  Diary Entry of John Quincy 
Adams (Dec. 23, 1820), supra note 119, at 217.  Nonetheless, Thompson thought that 
any slavers caught by British cruisers would have to be “tried by our own Courts.”  Id.  
Soon after, Thompson was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, where he served 
twenty years. 
121 Id. 
122 See infra subsection III.A.2, Section III.B. 
123 Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Dec. 23, 1820), supra note 119, at 216; see 
also Letter from Albert Gallatin to James Monroe (Feb. 4, 1822) (“The total suppres-
sion of that traffic has become such a popular topic in England that the Ministers are 
compelled to follow the stream, and to use everywhere every possible endeavor to ob-
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Albert Gallatin, at the time Minister to France, suggested that Brit-
ain would be willing to make major concessions on other fronts—such 
as a northern adjustment of the United States’ border with Canada and 
the opening of trade access to the West Indies markets—in exchange 
for U.S. agreement to the slave-trade treaty.124  Gallatin thought this was 
an opportunity worth exploring, particularly with regard to the West 
Indies markets, which he saw as more important for the United States 
than adjusting the northern border.125  However, he cautioned that 
Washington would first have to secure “modifications . . . which would 
render [the slave-trade convention] admissible.”126 
The possibility of gaining territorial and trade benefits in ex-
change for the slave-trade treaty may seem remarkable.  Yet there are 
reasons to believe that the possibility was not just an uncharacteristic 
flight of fancy on the part of the veteran diplomat.127  Britain had pre-
viously bought Spain’s and Portugal’s participation in slave-trade trea-
ties with gold.128  The United States would presumably need greater 
inducement than did the cash-strapped Iberian kingdoms.  Moreover, 
the slave-trade and border issues were explicitly linked in the Webster-
Ashburton Treaty of 1842, which suggested their fungibility.129  The 
persistence of British offers and its willingness to make significant ter-
ritorial and diplomatic concessions on other fronts suggests that the 
United States’ refusal was truly rooted in intractable constitutional ob-
jections rather than political ones.  The British apparently understood 
that the constitutional objections were in earnest and sought to work 
 
tain from other nations their assent to some measure tending to produce the desired 
effect.”), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN 231, 232 (Henry Adams ed., Phila-
delphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1879). 
124 See Letter from Albert Gallatin to James Monroe, supra note 123, at 232 (“[I]t 
would not be impossible to obtain, in consideration [of a modified slave-trade treaty], 
some favorable adjustment of other concerns.”). 
125 See id. at 233 (describing as “worthy of consideration” the possibility of agreeing 
to the treaty in exchange for concessions in the West Indies). 
126 Id. 
127 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Nov. 15, 1823) (list-
ing the agenda for negotiations with the British as including, according to Rush, sup-
pression of the slave trade and the northern boundary), in  12 THE WORKS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 325, 325 & n.1 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905). 
128 See Holger Lutz Kern, Strategies of Legal Change:  Great Britain, International Law, 
and the Abolition of the Transatlantic Slave Trade, 6 J. HIST. INT’L L. 233, 242-43 (2004). 
129 See Treaty to Settle and Define the Boundaries Between the Territories of the 
United States and the Possessions of Her Brittanic Majesty in North America; for the Fi-
nal Suppression of the African Slave Trade; and for the Giving Up of Criminals, Fugitive 
from Justice, in Certain Cases, U.S.-Gr. Brit., arts. I–III, VIII, Aug. 9, 1842, 8 Stat. 572. 
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around them.130  None of these workarounds, however, addressed the 
central U.S. objections.  Thus, Adams continued to insist that the “want 
of Constitutional authority to establish such a Court” was “decisive.”131 
D.  Congress’s Views 
The constitutional doubts about mixed courts were shared by 
Congress.  To be sure, the issue received less discussion in the Capitol 
than in the White House because the issue never progressed from the 
diplomatic stage to one at which the legislature could act on it.  How-
ever, as far as the views of Congress can be determined, its members 
concurred in or deferred to the Administration’s constitutional 
doubts.  This is particularly significant because the House was much 
more favorably inclined than the Administration to join the British 
against the slave trade. 
In the 1810s and 1820s, the slave-trade issue was high on Con-
gress’s agenda.  Congress passed several restrictive laws, culminating 
with the 1820 legislation establishing the death penalty for slave trad-
ing.132  Congress followed the Administration’s negotiations with Lon-
don closely and was aware of the arguments.133  Most in Congress ap-
parently favored some kind of agreement with Britain and other powers 
for the suppression of the trade.134  Two separate committees of the 
House considered the slave-trade issue in two consecutive Congresses. 
Having reviewed the diplomatic correspondence, the House 
formed a special committee in December 1820 to “make a summary 
review of the Constitution” as it bore on the “proposed co-operation 
to exterminate the slave trade.”135  Most of that committee’s report fo-
cused on the right of search.  Going against the views of the Adminis-
tration, the committee endorsed the idea of mutual search on the 
 
130 Canning offered to have one of the two tribunals sit in the United States—which 
would partially answer the objection to extraterritorial courts—and to make the U.S. 
commissioners impeachable by Congress.  Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 2, 
1820), supra note 113, at 182 ; Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 20, 1920), supra 
note 113, at 190.  
131 Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 2, 1820), supra note 113, at 182. 
132 See supra text accompanying note 90. 
133 See, e.g., Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams ( Jan. 9, 1821) (explaining how the 
House reviewed the full diplomatic correspondence on a slave-trade treaty), in 5 ADAMS 
MEMOIRS, supra note 104, at 231, 232-33. 
134 This can be inferred from the treatment of the 1824 search treaty, which was 
ratified by the Senate, albeit with reservations, and promoted by several resolutions in 
the House. 
135 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 1064 (1821). 
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ground that it was “indispensable to the great object of abolition” of 
the transatlantic trade and noted that Britain’s motives in seeking the 
arrangement were sincere rather than a pretext for entrenching Brit-
ish naval dominance.136  Thus, the hotly contested issue of search was, 
for the committee, a question of expedience, not one of principle.137 
Not so for the mixed courts, which the committee rejected be-
cause of constitutional doubts.138  The committee suggested that in-
stead of mixed tribunals, American vessels captured by the British 
should be returned to the United States for trial.139  While the report 
never flatly endorsed the Administration’s constitutional arguments, it 
quoted them favorably and at great length.  At no point did the com-
mittee or anyone else in Congress advocate mixed courts or even 
question the constitutional objections.140 
A report by the committee on the abolition of the slave trade in 
the following Congress came to identical conclusions.  That commit-
tee also urged joining with Britain to search vessels on the high seas.  
The committee noted that a proposal limited to a search treaty was 
free of the objections to the original British offer because the new 
proposal “contemplate[d] the trial and condemnation of such Ameri-
can citizens as may be found engaged in this forbidden trade, not by 
mixed tribunals sitting in a foreign country, but by existing courts, of 
competent jurisdiction, in the United States.”141 
Both reports recommended resolutions urging the President to 
negotiate with foreign powers toward a system for abolishing the in-
ternational slave trade, and these resolutions were overwhelmingly 
 
136 See id. at 1069 (“The proposal itself . . . is a total abandonment, on the part of 
England, of any claim to visit and search vessels in a time of peace . . . .”). 
137 See id. at 1070 (“[T]he reciprocal right . . . is reduced to the simple inquiry 
whether, in practice, it will be beneficial to the two contracting nations.”). 
138 See id. at 1068 (citing a letter from the Secretary of State expressing doubt that 
the U.S. government had the constitutional right to establish a court with foreign 
judges unaccountable to the U.S. appeals process and unable to be impeached). 
139 See id. at 1070 (“[A]n arrangement perhaps could be effected so . . . vessels and 
slaves delivered to the jurisdiction of the United States might be disposed of in con-
formity with the provisions of our own act . . . .”). 
140 There was little other discussion of the constitutional issue.  In one House de-
bate, Representative Wright urged the Administration to take action in entering a 
slave-trade treaty, opining that “if it shall be found that [the treaty provisions] cannot 
be exercised under our Constitution, . . . it may be so altered as to leave no impedi-
ment to so desirable an object.”  40 ANNALS OF CONG. 332 (1822). 
141 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 1537 (1822). 
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approved by the House.142  The reports themselves were not voted on 
by the full House, which leaves open the possibility that the legislature 
did not endorse all of their particulars.143  Nonetheless, when the reso-
lutions proposed by the report were debated, even those in Congress 
who strongly advocated allowing a right of search acknowledged that 
constitutional concerns required devising some workaround for the 
mixed courts.144 
E.  Commissions Overboard 
By mid-1822, negotiations with the United States were dead in the 
water.  Nevertheless, the British continually renewed their efforts.145  
Canning suggested that Britain was open to more substantial amend-
ments to the courts proposal, but he was yet again rebuffed by Adams 
because the former had suggested no “substitute for the mixed 
[c]ourts.”146  Adams was feeling increased pressure from the House, 
 
142 See 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 1151-55 (1823) (approving the resolution by a vote of 
131 to 9).  After the failure of this round of negotiations, the House passed yet another 
resolution, to the same effect, in 1831.  See 7 REG. DEB. 850 (1831) (passing, by a vote 
of 118 to 32, a resolution “request[ing the President] to renew and to prosecute from 
time to time such negotiations with the several maritime Powers of Europe and Ameri-
ca . . . for the effectual abolition of the African slave trade, and its ultimate denuncia-
tion, as piracy . . . by the consent of the civilized world”).  
143 Certainly some members felt that agreeing to the right of search itself went too 
far.  Representative Forsyth of Georgia, one of the nine members who voted against 
the 1821 and 1822 resolutions, argued that 
[committee] reports . . . are nothing, until acted upon by the House, but the 
opinions of so many members of the House, who approve them. . . . [A]t this 
session, a correspondence had been laid before this House which had taken 
place between this Government and the British Government, in which an ar-
gument was founded on certain expressions in a report of a committee of this 
House. . . . I protest against the opinion of a committee of this House being 
taken as an expression of the will of the House, unless first sanctioned by a 
vote of the House. . . . I for one, . . . believe the Senate acted right in refusing 
their assent to parts of that convention . . . . 
1 REG. DEB. 626 (1825). 
144 Compare 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 1153 (1823) (statement of Rep. Wright) (advo-
cating a “qualified right of search” by the British), with 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 332 
(1822) (statement of Rep. Wright) (expressing hope that if the British proposal “can-
not be exercised under our Constitution, . . . it may be so altered so as to leave no im-
pediment to so desirable an object”).  
145 See 42 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 3003 (1823) (letter from Stratford Canning to 
John Quincy Adams) (stating that “His Majesty’s Ministers are still unwilling to despair 
of finding the United States at length prepared” to join “the system of concert” pre-
viously proposed). 
146
Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams ( June 29, 1822), in 6 ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra 
note 104, at 35, 35-36. 
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however, to work out some kind of international agreement regarding 
the slave trade.147  Finally, a frustrated Canning, in April 1823, sarcasti-
cally proposed jettisoning the mixed courts in favor of purely British 
ones.148  If the United States objected to a novel international tribunal, 
surely it could not challenge the constitutional legitimacy of having slave 
traders tried solely by the British Admiralty courts.  After all, the Jay 
Treaty had provided for extradition to Britain of certain U.S. criminals. 
Canning’s proposal was not meant to be taken seriously—he knew 
the United States would never agree to such a one-sided arrangement.  
But something in the idea—national courts instead of mixed commis-
sions—was reflected in a compromise position that emerged in 1822 
and 1823.  It is not clear where this idea first arose, but by 1823 both 
the House149 and certain figures in the Monroe Administration 
thought the deadlock over prosecution could be broken by requiring 
captured offenders to be sent to their home countries for trial.150  
While far from the British proposal, it would allow the United States 
to at least participate in the joint search aspect of the treaty.  Adams 
formally submitted the counteroffer to Canning in March 1823, not-
ing that it would be “a substitute for . . . trial by mixed commissions, 
which would be rendered useless by it.”151  The British agreed, and a 
convention was signed and submitted to the Senate. 
 
147 See Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams ( June 20, 1823) (describing “views un-
friendly to [the] Administration, and personally so to [Adams,]” coming from mem-
bers of Congress), in 6 ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 104, at 149, 150; Diary Entry of 
John Quincy Adams ( June 19, 1823) (reporting how Adams argued before the Cabinet 
that the Administration should “carry into effect the resolution of the House of Repre-
sentatives recommending negotiation to obtain the recognition of the slave-trade to be 
piracy by the law of nations”), in 6 ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 104, at 148, 148.  It is 
not clear why Adams felt so constrained by the nonbinding resolution of the House in 
an area of Executive supremacy.  In any event, he was certainly amply rewarded for his 
solicitude of the people’s representatives when they elected him President in 1825. 
148 See 42 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 3006-10 (1823). 
149 See COMM. ON THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE, 17TH CONG., REPORT OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE 3 (1822), available at 
http://digital.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=mayantislavery;idno=28893027 
(follow “View Pamphlet or Book” hyperlink) (noting that the constitutional  “objec-
tions apply . . . to a particular proposition” that includes use of mixed courts rather than 
to the modified proposal that would use “existing courts, of competent jurisdiction, in 
the United States”).  
150 See Letter from Albert Gallatin to John Quincy Adams ( Jan. 18, 1823), in THE 
WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN, supra note 123, at 264, 265 (suggesting that the right 
of search, with rendition of detained vessels to the home country, would be an accept-
able alternative to the constitutionally problematic mixed-court proposal). 
151 42 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 3005 (1823). 
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Adams had only pursued the treaty because of pressure from the 
House.  He feared that the treaty would set a precedent for British 
meddling on the high seas.152  However, even with the mixed-courts 
provisions removed and certain other concessions requested by Adams 
already made by Britain, the treaty proved highly controversial in the 
Senate.  In May 1824, the Senate gave its consent, but it did so only after 
making numerous reservations.153  Perhaps the most significant of these 
was limiting the right of search to the coast of Africa, barring it from the 
American coast.  This made the treaty much less useful to the British, 
who already had a squadron stationed off of the African coast.  The 
British saw this watered-down ratification as a back-handed rejection of 
the treaty,154 a view in which they were no doubt justified.155 
The Senate’s opposition to any concession on the right of search 
was made clear a few months later, when the Administration nego-
tiated a slave-trade treaty with Colombia incorporating all the Senate’s 
reservations to the failed British convention.  Nonetheless, the Senate 
also rejected the Colombian convention, though the prospect of 
search by Colombian vessels was quite remote,156 thereby demonstrat-
ing that the Senate was not prepared to make any concessions on the 
right of search.  The British and American governments saw further 
negotiation as futile, and the diplomatic correspondence was officially 
 
152 See Memorandum from Rufus King (May 23, 1824), in KING, supra note 21, at 
572-73 (describing Adams’s initial hesitation in agreeing to search on the high seas).  
He had insisted, as a condition of signing a search treaty, that Britain enact legislation 
mirroring America’s 1820 act, declaring the slave trade to be piratical.  See Diary Entry 
of John Quincy Adams (June 19, 1823), supra note 147, at 148-49.  This ensured that 
any search exercised by Britain would not establish a general right of search on the 
high seas but rather would be incident to the established right to search for pirates. 
153 See AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 109, at 361-62 (recording the Senate 
vote on ratification of the 1824 treaty). 
154 See Letter from George Canning to Richard Rush (Aug. 27, 1824) (noting Brit-
ish disapproval of the amended treaty), in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 109, at 364. 
155 See Letter from Rufus King to Charles King (May 22, 1824) (“The Senate has ad-
vised the Ratification of the Convention with Great Britain for the suppression of the 
Slave Trade upon conditions that will defeat the same; in other words they have rejected 
it.”), in KING, supra note 21, at 571. 
156 See 2 REG. DEB. app. at 38 (1826) (noting the rejection of the Colombian Con-
vention, even though “the coasts of America were excepted from its operation”); W. 
STULL HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE SENATE:  A STUDY OF THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN 
PRESIDENT AND SENATE OVER THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 50-51 (1933) (dis-
cussing the politics of the Colombian treaty rejection and noting that it was the first 
treaty entirely rejected by the Senate). 
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suspended in 1825.157  Nonetheless, international agreements to sup-
press the slave trade, featuring both the right of search and mixed 
courts, remained a key part of British foreign policy in the following 
decades.158  After the disappointment and betrayal of the 1824 treaty 
had faded somewhat, subsequent British governments again made 
overtures to the United States, in the 1830s, then again in the years 
leading up to the Webster-Ashburton treaty of 1842,159 and even as late 
as 1862.  The British desire to achieve a treaty apparently never flagged. 
The subsequent negotiations, and the attendant domestic political 
debates, focused on the right of search.  Not surprisingly, mixed com-
missions were not featured explicitly in these negotiations.  Commis-
sions could only come into play if the parties agreed to a mutual right 
of search.  Given the decisive rejection of the search treaty, as well as the 
overwhelming opposition to renewed search proposals in the early 
1840s and again in the late 1850s,160 the commissions were off the table 
 
157 See 2 REG. DEB. app. at 39 (1826) (letter from Henry Clay to Henry Addington) 
(“[I]t would seem to be unnecessary and inexpedient any longer to continue the nego-
tiation respecting the Slave Convention . . . .”). 
158 See Charles Sumner, Final Suppression of the Slave Trade, Speech in the Senate 
on the Treaty with Great Britain (Apr. 24, 1862) (“Not disheartened by failure with the 
United States, Great Britain pursued her honorable policy, enlisting Government after 
Government . . . .”), in 6 THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 474, 481 (Boston, Lee & 
Shepard 1872) [hereinafter SUMNER]; Martinez, supra note 15, at 595 (listing treaties 
with Brazil, Chile, the Argentine Confederation, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Ecuador). 
159 See DANIEL WEBSTER, THE DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PAPERS OF DANIEL WEB-
STER, at xix (New York, Harper & Bros. 1848) (“Attempts were made on the part of 
England, during the ministry of Lord Melbourne, to renew the negotiation with the 
United States, but without success.”).  Certainly there was still strong support in the 
House for such arrangements.  In 1831, Colonel Mercer offered, and the House passed 
by an overwhelming vote, yet another resolution calling on the President “to renew 
and to prosecute . . . negotiations with the several maritime Powers . . . for the effectual 
abolition of the African slave trade, and its ultimate denunciation, as piracy, under the 
law of nations.”  7 REG. DEB. 850 (1831). 
160 See, e.g., 38 HOUSE J. 485, 486 (1843) (message of President John Tyler) (de-
nouncing British efforts to search U.S. ships suspected of slave trading as an “arbitrary 
and ever-varying system of maritime police”); 33 SEN. J. app. 689, 693 (1842) (message 
of President John Tyler) (“The examination or visitation of the merchant vessels of 
one nation, by the cruisers of another, for any purpose [with certain exceptions] 
. . . may lead to dangerous results. . . . Interference with a merchant vessel by an armed 
cruiser, is always a delicate proceeding, apt to touch the point of national honor, as 
well as to affect the interests of individuals.”).  See generally HENRY WHEATON, ENQUIRY 
INTO THE VALIDITY OF THE BRITISH CLAIM TO A RIGHT OF VISITATION AND SEARCH OF 
AMERICAN VESSELS SUSPECTED TO BE ENGAGED IN THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE 148-51 
(Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard 1842) (arguing strongly against the British right of 
search on international law and policy grounds, while surveying the history of the ne-
gotiations regarding the suppression of the slave trade, including the mixed-
commissions episode). 
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after 1825, even if still desired by Britain.  Nonetheless, the commissions 
hovered in the background of the subsequent search debates.161 
III.  UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS 
The rejection of mixed courts on constitutional grounds may 
seem surprising, as the United States had agreed to other “mixed 
commissions” under the Jay Treaty.  Moreover, Congress had estab-
lished non–Article III courts for the Louisiana and Mississippi territo-
ries.162  Indeed, just a few hours after rejecting the slave-trade mixed 
commissions, the Cabinet discussed, without any constitutional hesita-
tion, the possibility of a mixed commission to adjudicate claims of 
U.S. citizens against Spain.163  The Cabinet was either shamelessly hy-
pocritical, or it saw some substantial difference between the slave-
trade mixed commission and the other courts and international 
commissions with which the country had experience.164 
This Part pieces together and evaluates the various constitutional 
objections advanced against the slave-trade courts.  These arguments 
developed over time, and Wirt and Adams disagreed as to the reasons 
for the unconstitutionality.  The arguments were of two kinds, struc-
tural and rights-based.  Section A explains Wirt’s and Adams’s differ-
ing views on the nature of the Article III problem.  This Section dwells 
more on Adams’s narrower position both because it dominated the 
diplomatic correspondence with Britain and because it is more consis-
 
161 See 33 SEN. J. app. 689, 693 (1842) (message of President John Tyler) (mention-
ing treaties between Britain and other nations that authorized each to “seize, and 
bring in for adjudication, vessels found engaged in the slave-trade” as part of the back-
ground to U.S. efforts to refrain from any such commitments).  When the rejection of 
the commissions was recalled, it was treated as a settled question.  Cf. United States v. 
Watkins, 28 F. Cas. 419, 462 (C.C.D.C. 1829) (No. 16,649) (Thruston, J., dissenting) 
(“The negotiation with Great Britain, respecting the suppression of the slave trade, 
failed upon the ground that the United States could not give power to the courts of 
another nation to punish the violation of the laws of the United States.”). 
162 Ironically, John Quincy Adams had been one of the few to argue that the ar-
rangement for territorial judges was unconstitutional.  See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CON-
STITUTION IN CONGRESS:  THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829, at 113 n.195 (2001). 
163 See Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams, supra note 104, at 152.  The idea was 
raised as part of the Adams-Onis Treaty, which granted Florida to America.  The Cabi-
net ultimately favored all-American commissioners, though apparently not for consti-
tutional reasons.  The constitutionality of the commission’s judicial role was upheld in 
Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193 (1828).  See id. at 212-13 (“The object of the treaty 
was to invest the commissioners with full power and authority to . . . decide upon the 
amount and validity of the asserted claims upon Spain, for damages and injuries. . . . 
[T]he award of the commissioners . . . presents no bar to the action . . . .”).   
164 Adams in his diaries does not suggest hypocrisy. 
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tent with both past and future practice.  Section B discusses a second 
wave of objections raised by Adams, which focus on the mixed courts’ 
failure to afford American defendants such Bill of Rights protections 
as the jury trial. 
While Adams’s rights-based views resonate with modern jurispru-
dence, they still invite the question of how Adams and his colleagues 
reconciled these views with their role in creating the very tribunals 
that modern scholars take as a permissive precedent for the entire 
concept of non–Article III courts.  These tribunals—like the Jay Treaty 
commission and the early territorial courts—seem to have had some 
of the same defects that the Monroe Administration complained of in 
the slave-trade courts.  Section C seeks to isolate the key differences 
between the slave-trade courts and other tribunals in order to under-
stand why the former were considered unconstitutional.  It suggests that 
the criminal jurisdiction of the slave-trade courts made nineteenth-
century statesmen decide to treat them differently from other bodies.  
Finally, Section D explains why these arguments deserve considerable 
respect despite their having been formulated by the political branches. 
A.  Structural Constitutional Objections 
1.  Wirt’s Nondelegation Arguments 
At the Cabinet meeting in 1818 where the mixed-commission 
proposal was first aired, Wirt rattled off a list of constitutional objec-
tions of varying degrees of plausibility.165  His blunderbuss attack can 
be broken down into four separate objections:  nondelegation, natio-
nality of the judges, extraterritorial courts, and impeachability.166  
First, the judicial power is vested in Article III courts and thus cannot 
be given to other kinds of tribunals.  This general nondelegation ar-
gument is Wirt’s weightiest and the only one echoed by current critics 
of the international courts.  Second, Wirt said that judicial power can 
only be given to U.S. citizens.  This argument is hard to support be-
cause Article III, unlike provisions dealing with Congress and the Pres-
idency, does not establish any nationality requirement for judges.167  
Third, Wirt saw problems in a court that would “sit without the bounds 
 
165 This is at least the impression given by the condensed record of the meeting in 
Adams’s diaries.   
166 See Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams, supra note 104, at 151. 
167 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring citizenship for election to the U.S. 
House of Representatives); id. § 3, cl. 3 (requiring the same for the U.S. Senate); id. 
art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (requiring natural-born citizenship for the presidency). 
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of the United States.”168  Because jurisdiction was strictly territorial, 
based on sovereign control of an area, it was a non sequitur for a court 
to sit where it had no control.  Still, this would not necessarily explain 
why a U.S. official could not exercise power abroad with the consent of 
the forum state.169  Finally, Wirt noted that unlike Article III judges, the 
commissioners would not be “amenable to impeachment.”170  That the 
judges would not have life tenure was not mentioned as a concern.  
Thus, Wirt’s concern was that the judges would be insufficiently ac-
countable rather than insufficiently independent.  Their exercise of 
power over U.S. citizens would be unhampered by any domestic control. 
Adams replied that there was no nondelegation problem.  The 
source of Congress’s authority to establish such a court, he replied, was 
not Article III but rather the treaty power, which was “without limitation 
in the Constitution.”171  He cited as precedent the prior international 
commissions to which the United States had agreed.172  While the vote 
 
168 See Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams, supra note 104, at 151. 
169 Adams made this point by recalling the “Courts of Admiralty which it has been pro-
posed to establish at Naples if we could have obtained consent of that Government.”  Id. 
170 Id.  Wirt was probably referring to the foreign commissioners, not the Ameri-
can ones; the latter could probably have been removed by Congress like other ap-
pointed officials under the general impeachment provision.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 
(providing that “all civil officers of the United States” can be removed for certain kinds 
of wrongdoing); see also CURRIE, supra note 162, at 113 n.192 (noting that Congress as-
sumed that territorial officers and judges could be impeached).  Their impeachability 
would depend on their being U.S. officials seconded to a foreign agency rather than 
on their being officers of a non–U.S. institution who happened to have been selected 
by Washington.  Some might argue that nonimpeachability would demonstrate that 
the official was not an officer of the United States and thus eliminate any separation of 
powers concerns.  Yet this tack would make international delegations constitutionally 
even easier than domestic ones. 
 In regard to the slave court, the assumption seems to have been that U.S. commis-
sioners remained removable officers of the United States.  A modern case involving the 
U.S.-Canada Boundary Commission opined in dicta that treaties could not limit presi-
dential removal power to the same extent statutes could.  See Leu v. Int’l Boundary 
Comm’n, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1207-08, 1211-12 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (holding that 
while the International Boundary Commission was supposed to function as an inde-
pendent agency, its constitutive treaty did not limit presidential removal power over 
the U.S. commissioner).  It would be much harder to say that treaties could insulate an 
official from impeachment or removal in ways that would, in a domestic setting, violate 
the separation of powers.  
171 Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams, supra note 104, at 151.  Adams appears to 
have anticipated the view, associated with Missouri v. Holland, that Congress can, pur-
suant to a valid treaty, do what would otherwise exceed its enumerated powers. 
172 Two years later, the British ambassador futilely invoked the Jay Treaty 
precedent to Adams, who by then was set on the proposal’s unconstitutionality.  See 
Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 20, 1820), supra note 113, at 190 (recounting 
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against the proposal was unanimous, Adams, in his diary, suggested that 
at the end of the Cabinet meeting he remained unconvinced by Wirt’s 
positions.  At some point, however, he concluded that the tribunals 
would be unconstitutional for an entirely different set of reasons. 
2.  Adams’s Appellate Objections 
Despite his rejection of Wirt’s nondelegation arguments, Adams 
came to the conclusion that mixed commissions would nonetheless be 
impermissible on other grounds.  His change of position can be in-
ferred not only from his vigorous insistence in discussions with Can-
ning that the commissions were unconstitutional—for this may merely 
mean he was a faithful agent not deviating from the Administration’s 
position173—but also from the fact that he raised, and insisted on, con-
stitutional objections to the courts in the subsequent diplomatic cor-
respondence.  Adams cited the lack of review by Article III courts and 
the lack of individual rights protections as new reasons that the com-
missions were unconstitutional,174 which he substituted for the nonde-
legation objection.  Even his diaries—where he sometimes recorded 
sentiments at odds with those expressed in his diplomatic correspon-
dence—show him to be committed to the position he took publicly 
against the constitutionality of the mixed commissions.175 
In his correspondence with London, Adams argued that the lack 
of appeal from the mixed commissions’ judgments was a constitution-
al problem.  Congress could not create tribunals “irresponsible to the 
 
Canning’s plea to the “precedent [of] the Commissions to which we had agreed by 
Treaty to submit questions of property and territorial rights”). 
173 If Adams disagreed with the Monroe Administration’s position on the mixed 
courts, he could in theory have reversed it when he succeeded as President.  In prac-
tice, this would not have been a likely course, and his failure to revive the question as 
President means little.  Adams was not enthusiastic about the right of search in the first 
place, the Senate was hostile to it, and Adams’s close election by the House of Repre-
sentatives left him with little political capital.  There would have been little reason to 
revisit the unpopular issue.  Moreover, the Senate’s rejection of the modified search 
treaty in 1824 cast a pall on subsequent negotiations during Adams’s Administration.  
See Letter from John Quincy Adams to Albert Gallatin (Dec. 12, 1827) (writing that 
Canning “had been laying up a stock of resentments, for which he was hoping to ex-
pose us to public and open humiliation” because of the “disappointment of the slave-
trade convention”), in THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN, supra note 123, at 398.  
174 Adams’s positions would later be fully endorsed by the Cabinet.  See Diary Entry 
of John Quincy Adams (Dec. 23, 1820), supra note 119, at 217. 
175 See Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 26, 1820), supra note 123, at 192 
(“I had told [Canning] there was one certain Constitutional difficulty which we saw no 
way of getting over.  This of itself was decisive for the present.  I had not thought it ne-
cessary to mention that there was another, which might prove no less embarrassing.”). 
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supreme corrective tribunal of the American Union.”176  The mixed 
court’s decisions could not be reviewed by the Supreme Court or  
any tribunal.177  (Indeed, there was no appeals process at all under the 
mixed-courts treaties.) 
Article I gives Congress the power to “constitute Tribunals inferior 
to the supreme Court,”178 while Article III says that the “judicial Power 
of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”179  The former provision suggests to some that there is 
an entity called a “tribunal,” distinct from a court, that Congress can 
create pursuant to this Article I “constituting” power—thus called an 
“Article I court.”  The text of Clause 9 suggests that tribunals as well as 
courts must be “inferior” to the Supreme Court.  Indeed, one might 
think the very identification of the only judicial body created by the 
Constitution as “supreme” means it must have precedence over all 
other federally created tribunals.180  As a result, Adams’s argument that 
nonreviewability made the mixed courts unconstitutional has a firmer 
textual basis than do the general structural nondelegation arguments.181 
The appellate objection resonates with the modern jurisprudence 
on non–Article III tribunals.  In the modern view, non–Article III tri-
bunals must be reviewable by Article III courts at least to some ex-
tent.182  Complete preclusion of Supreme Court review of questions of 
federal law, especially constitutional ones, is seen as a highly dubious 
 
176
WHEATON, supra note 160, at 79. 
177 See 42 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 3011 (1823) (letter from John Quincy Adams 
to Stratford Canning) (objecting that the commissions would be “under no subordina-
tion to the ordinary judicial tribunals of the country”); Letter from John Quincy 
Adams to Albert Gallatin and Richard Rush, supra note 109, at 73 (noting that the tri-
bunal would be unacceptable because it would “decid[e] upon the statutes of the 
United States without appeal”).  This point may have been made in the Cabinet debate 
but was not recorded by Adams in his diary. 
178 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
179 Id. art. III, § 1. 
180 It is not clear what it means for a court to be “inferior.”  Professor James Pfand-
er has argued powerfully that it means there must be the possibility of direct or habeas 
review.  See James E. Pfander, Essay, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Con-
stitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 212-14 (2007).  
One might instead argue that inferiority means the Supreme Court’s precedents are 
binding rather than persuasive authority for all lower courts.  See id. at 214.  The mixed 
commissions were not inferior in either of these senses. 
181 Indeed, Adams might have elaborated on his argument by noting that writs of 
habeas corpus would presumably not run to the slave-trade courts; this would eliminate 
any avenue for Supreme Court review and possibly constitute a suspension of the writ. 
182 See supra subsection I.A.3. 
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use of the Article III “exceptions” power.  Finally, non-appealability 
distinguishes the proposed commissions from territorial courts, 
though not from earlier international commissions or courts martial. 
B.  Bill of Rights Objections 
A separate set of objections stressed that the mixed courts would 
not be subject to the Bill of Rights.  The treaty would create a court in 
which United States citizens could be tried for conduct that was crim-
inal under American law without the relevant constitutional protec-
tions of individual rights.  In the view of Adams and others, this was 
outside the Senate’s power. 
The lack of grand and petit juries was the principal defect.  Adams 
argued that the Constitution “expressly prohibit[ed] . . . erecting any 
judicial courts . . . to which American citizens should be called to an-
swer for any penal offence without the intervention of a grand jury to 
accuse and of a jury of trial to decide upon the charge.”183  Thus, the 
U.S. government cannot create a system to try and to punish citizens 
that escapes the procedural requirements of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.184  Indeed, in one interview with Canning, who had 
come to rehash the matter in hopes of finding a solution compatible 
with U.S. law,185 Adams dramatically read the Fifth Amendment aloud, 
concluding that it “amount[ed] to an express prohibition” on creating 
such a tribunal.186 
The severity of the crimes and their potential consequences rein-
forced the need for a jury.187  Federal juries in slave-trade trials had 
 
183 Letter from John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning, supra note 116. 
184 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, 
[except in the wartime armed forces] . . . .”); id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .” (empha-
sis added)).  Significantly, applicability of these amendments is not limited to any par-
ticular federal tribunal but depends instead on the defendant being held and prosecuted 
by the government. 
185 See Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 26, 1820) (“Mr. Canning 
called. . . . He brought with him a long written paper, containing what he had under-
stood as the substance of our former conversations [on the slave trade], which he 
. . . wished to read to me . . . .”), supra note 113, at 191-92. 
186 Id. at 192.  Adams did not make clear if he was referring to the requirement of 
a grand jury or to the broader “due process” provision.  However, his reference to an 
“express” prohibition suggests the former.   
187 See, e.g., 42 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 3029 (1823) (“[W]hen the crime and the 
punishment are aggravated to involve the life of the accused, it affords but a more im-
perative inducement for securing to him the benefit of a trial by his countrymen and 
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sometimes shown extreme leniency bordering on nullification.  This 
was particularly true for minor participants, as the entire crew from 
cabin boy to captain faced the death penalty.188  The perceived inade-
quacy of U.S. justice was one of the reasons Britain sought to establish 
international courts in the first place.  Adams seemed to think that the 
jury-trial right was not merely a guarantee of fairness but of judgment 
by people with certain backgrounds, norms, and values.  Even the 
fairest foreign judge could not replace a jury. 
Recall that Adams had rejected the nondelegation argument 
against mixed courts.  He reasoned that the treaty power allowed 
Congress to do what was not independently authorized by Article I, 
Section 8.  Thus, it could create courts of a kind not otherwise auth-
orized.  But this did not mean those courts could be free of all consti-
tutional constraints.  Adams clearly thought that the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments—and thus, presumably, the Bill of Rights—limited all 
exercises of the treaty power.  While the treaty power could trump fe-
deralism limitations on Congress, it could not defeat enumerated in-
dividual rights (or, as his insistence on Supreme Court review demon-
strated, the horizontal restraints of separation of powers). 
Adams’s position anticipated the approach that modern jurispru-
dence has taken on the limits of the treaty power.  Yet the insistence 
that the Bill of Rights guarantees must still apply entirely anticipated 
Reid v. Covert, which held that treaties cannot suspend constitutional 
criminal process rights.189 
While Missouri v. Holland stands for nothing more than the inap-
plicability of federalism and enumerated-powers limits to legislation 
 
his peers.”).  The slave trade had been made a capital offense in the United States in 
1820, though no other nation had attached such severe penalties to this crime.  See 
DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC:  AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY 151-52 (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001).  
The U.S. law was particularly severe because it applied to all crew members and own-
ers, regardless of the extent of their role in the slave-trading expedition. 
188 Slave vessels were often captured on their outward voyage, when they did not 
yet have slaves on board.  Convictions in such cases were based on circumstantial evi-
dence involving the equipment on board.  Juries, especially in Southern states, were 
often reluctant to convict in such cases.  See Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (May 8, 
1840) (“I suppose it as impossible to commit a slave-trader at Baltimore as in the island 
of Cuba . . . .”), in 10 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 283, 284 (Charles Francis 
Adams ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1876).  This reluctance was greatly rein-
forced by the severe punishment under the 1820 Act of Congress.  See FEHRENBACHER, 
supra note 187, at 152, 199-200 (explaining that although the Act imposed the death 
penalty for slave trading, only one person was ever executed under the Act, and not 
until 1862). 
189 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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pursuant to treaties, it is sometimes more broadly described as ex-
empting treaty legislation from any “structural” constitutional rules.190  
Adams’s objections to the slave-trade courts reveal the difficulty in 
treating structural limitations differently than rights-based ones.191  
Consider the right to a jury trial.  Here, the Bill of Rights and Article 
III overlap:  both provide for a jury trial in criminal cases.192  The loca-
tion of the criminal jury right in Article III may suggest a greater con-
stitutional imperative for Article III courts in criminal than in civil 
cases.193  Moreover, Article III may be a package deal:  the require-
ment of Article III juries in criminal cases may presume an Article III 
judge to charge them.194  Seventh Amendment juries, by contrast, 
may be able to operate under the guidance of non–Article III 
judges.195  If treaties cannot abolish individual rights, they also can-
not fully get around Article III, since the Article includes some such 
rights.  This view may have informed the Article III objections 
against the mixed tribunals.196 
 
190 See McGinnis, supra note 4, at 1746 (“[T]he treaty power dissolves structural 
constitutional impediments to international delegation . . . .”). 
191 See Antonin Scalia, Foreword:  The Importance of Structure in Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1417, 1418 (2008) (arguing that the structural provi-
sions of the Constitution were designed to protect individual liberty). 
192 Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases 
of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . .”), with id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”). 
193 This view comports with current jurisprudence on non–Article III courts, which 
allows them to the extent they are not an end run around the civil jury-trial right.  See, 
e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 61-65 (1989) (noting that non–
Article III courts may be allowed but that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial 
may not be eliminated “merely by relabeling the cause of action to which it attaches 
and placing exclusive jurisdiction” in a non–Article III court).  
194 See id. at 62-63 (“[The] claim that juries may serve usefully as checks only on 
the decisions of judges who enjoy life tenure overlooks the extent to which judges who 
are appointed for fixed terms may be beholden to Congress or Executive Officials, and 
thus ignores the potential for juries to exercise beneficial restraint on their decisions.” 
(citation omitted)). 
195 This is the practice in bankruptcy courts, though it requires the parties’ con-
sent.  See 28 U.S.C. § 157(e)(2006) (“If the right to a jury trial applies in a proceeding 
that may be heard under this section by a bankruptcy judge, the bankruptcy judge may 
conduct the jury trial if specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district 
court and with the express consent of all the parties.”). 
196 This may help explain why the mixed tribunals were objectionable but the use 
of mixed commissions to settle civil claims between nationals of the United States and 
other countries was not. 
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C.  The Importance of Criminal Jurisdiction 
The extent of the proposed mixed courts’ jurisdiction may be cru-
cial to understanding the constitutional controversy.  The matter is 
somewhat obscure because the British did not spell out the details of 
their proposal.  (To avoid chiseling by the Americans, Canning did 
not want to commit a draft to writing until the parties reached an 
agreement in principle.)  However, much of the discussion in Wash-
ington treated the courts as if they would exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion over the officers and crew of the vessel.197  As a diplomatic note to 
the British put it, the United States could not give a foreign court 
“power over the persons, property and reputation of the citizens.”198  
Adams always referred to the commissions as “penal” and described 
them as “trying” U.S. citizens.199  Gallatin thus explained America’s re-
fusal to join the British project on the ground that it would be “re-
pugnant to our Constitution” for the “property and, above all, the per-
sons of our citizens” to be tried by a mixed commission.200  As late as 
1823, Adams described the proposal as one where an “offence” would 
be “charged upon [our] citizens.”201  Moreover, the repeated objection 
that the tribunals would not employ grand or petit juries202 suggests 
 
197 Adams spoke of the proposal as giving Britain power over “offenders and of-
fence[s]” aboard U.S. vessels, and of the mixed commission having “power over the 
persons . . . and reputation of the citizens of this country.”  Letter from John Quincy 
Adams to Stratford Canning, supra note 116.  When the House committee wrote in 
support of the ultimately failed search treaty, it noted that this arrangement 
represented a modification of the original British proposal in that it “contemplate[d] 
the trial and condemnation of such American citizens as may be found engaged in this 
forbidden trade, not by mixed tribunals sitting in a foreign country, but by existing 
courts, of competent jurisdiction, in the United States.”  COMM. ON THE SUPPRESSION 
OF THE SLAVE TRADE, supra note 149, at 3.  Similarly, the French, who also rejected the 
British proposals, clearly understood that they only contemplated jurisdiction over the 
vessel yet referred to them as “mixed commissions, charged with pronouncing upon 
the culpability of the individuals.”  Memoir of the French Government on the Slave 
Trade, in COMM. ON THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE, supra note 149, at 74, 79. 
198 Letter from John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning, supra note 116. 
199 Id. 
200 Letter from Albert Gallatin to John Quincy Adams (Feb. 2, 1822), in THE WRIT-
INGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN, supra note 123, at 229, 230 (emphasis added). 
201 42 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 3029 (1823) (letter from John Quincy Adams to 
Alexander Everett). 
202 Proceedings to condemn a vessel would fall within admiralty jurisdiction and 
be heard solely by a judge, even in United States courts.  However, criminal offenses 
falling within the federal admiralty jurisdiction would be heard by a jury.  See Granfi-
nanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 55 n.10 (1989) (“Civil causes of action in ad-
miralty . . . are not suits at common law for Seventh Amendment purposes, and thus 
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that the proposal was regarded as punitive in nature.  Britain did little 
to dispel this impression.203  Thus, while apparently aware of the li-
mited jurisdiction of the existing mixed commissions, the Administra-
tion also seemed to think of them as criminal.204 
There are several ways to understand why the tribunals would be 
seen as criminal in nature.  First, the British may have failed to make 
clear the noncriminal nature of the proposal, either by informally 
suggesting the possibility of criminal jurisdiction—including punish-
ment of offenders—or simply by sending mixed signals.  It could not 
have helped that some of the materials that the British presented to 
Washington also described the arrangements in criminal terms.205  
The imprecision in the British proposal may have led the Administra-
tion to assume the worst.206 
Castlereagh sent to Washington the mixed-court treaties with other 
countries as a model of his proposal.  Those courts had jurisdiction only 
over the ships and their cargo; the crew would either be let loose or re-
patriated for prosecution.207  Even if, as is likely, the Administration and 
Congress understood that the courts would only be “authorized to con-
 
no constitutional right to a jury trial attaches.”); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 
433, 447 (1830).  
203 Though Canning at one point defended the commission as akin to “trials for 
forfeitures,” see Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 20, 1820), supra  note 105,  at 
190, he did not reiterate this argument in his numerous discussions and correspon-
dences with Adams and Rush. 
204 Wheaton, writing twenty years later, when any confusion about the nature of 
the proposal was surely resolved, also presented it in a criminal light.  See WHEATON, 
supra note 160. 
205 An 1819 resolution of the House of Lords, calling for the United States to join 
the mixed-courts system, noted that it would allow for “seizing vessels engaged in the 
criminal traffic, and for bringing to punishment those who shall still be guilty of these 
nefarious practices.”  Resolution of July 9, 1819, reprinted in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, 
supra note 109, at 80.  Similarly, a counterproposal by Russia called for establishing, 
instead of the mixed-tribunals network, an international court that would “judge all 
crimes relating to the trade.”  Opinion of the Russian Cabinet upon the Slave Trade 
(Nov. 7, 1818), in COMM. ON THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE, supra note 149, at 
72, 73-74.  The offer appears to be a tactic to refuse Britain’s offer by agreeing to even 
more than London could accept. 
206 Similarly, uncertainties about the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court lead those inclined to be suspicious to entertain the worst-case scenarios, which 
supporters of the court dismiss as unlikely.  
207 See Despatch from Lord Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst (Nov. 2, 1818) (Memo-
randum A) (“The mixed commission has no jurisdiction of a criminal character . . . .”), 
in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 109, at 115; see also Martinez, supra note 15, at 
591 (noting that mixed courts lacked criminal jurisdiction over the crew of a seized 
slave vessel). 
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demn” vessels, they still may have seen this as criminal.208  The proceed-
ings which Castlereagh described as noncriminal would have been re-
garded as criminal under U.S. law.209  Condemnation of a vessel, while 
nominally in rem, can be criminal when done to punish the owner.210  
The slave-court condemnation would have the key characteristic of a 
criminal proceeding in that it determined the blameworthiness of the 
owners and crew.211  In such cases, forfeiture proceedings would trigger 
constitutional criminal procedure protections.212  Whether forfeiture was 
criminal appears to have been a highly fact-specific question in the early 
nineteenth century.  While not necessarily criminal,213 it could be consi-
 
208 Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams, supra note 104, at 151; see also Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court art. 77(2)(b), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (pro-
viding for forfeiture of property as a criminal penalty administrable by the ICC); 37 AN-
NALS OF CONG. 1067 (1821) (describing the proposal as giving courts jurisdiction over 
vessels only).   
209 Ironically, confiscation of assets—whether civil or criminal—was later cited by 
Crowell v. Benson, the seminal modern case on the permissibility of non–Article III ad-
judication, as a paradigmatic example of the kind of case that required an Article III 
forum even at the trial level.  See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932).   
210 See The Emily and the Caroline, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 381, 388-89 (1824) (“[The 
U.S. statute allowing for condemnation of vessels fitted out for the slave trade] fur-
nishes authority to take from the offender the means designed for the perpetration of 
the mischief.  This is not punishing, criminally, the intention merely; it is the preparation 
of the vessel, and the purpose for which she is to be employed, that constitute the offence 
. . . .” (emphasis added)).  Justice Thompson had, until the previous year, been the 
Navy Secretary in Monroe’s Administration and had participated in all the Cabinet dis-
cussions of the mixed-courts treaty.  Thus, The Emily is particularly strong evidence that 
the Cabinet saw the British proposals as “punishing criminally.”  This was certainly the 
view of the French.  See Memoir of the French Government on the Slave Trade, supra 
note 197 (“In vain would it be alleged that the mixed commission does not exercise its 
jurisdiction in a criminal manner, and that it only pronounces upon the legality of the 
seizure of the vessel . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
211 See Letter from John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning, supra note 116 (not-
ing that commissions would have power over the “reputation” of U.S. citizens). 
212 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886) (opining that “proceed-
ings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man’s property by rea-
son of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their na-
ture criminal” and thus trigger Bill of Rights protections); see also One 1958 Plymouth 
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965) (holding that evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment is admissible and may not be relied on to sustain a 
forfeiture).  But see United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 270-71 (1996) (holding that 
civil forfeiture is not a “punishment” for double jeopardy purposes).  See generally The 
Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1827) (discussing the relation between forfei-
ture in admiralty and criminal liability, and holding that the latter is not necessary for 
the former). 
213 See The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1897) (“The suit is a civil suit in rem 
for the condemnation of the vessel [for violations of neutrality] only, and is not a crim-
inal prosecution.  The two proceedings are wholly independent and pursued in differ-
ent courts, and the result in each might be different.”). 
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dered so when it was punitive in purpose or part of a scheme of criminal 
enforcement.214 
Forfeiture was clearly criminal in slave-trading cases.  The con-
demnation of a vessel in U.S. courts would fall under the Act crimina-
lizing the slave trade.  In these cases, proving criminal intent on the 
part of the owners or crew was essential to condemning a vessel.215  
Several other factors suggest the criminal nature of the forfeiture:  
First, its purpose was to punish the vessel’s owners and backers; losing 
a ship was regarded as an extremely severe sanction.216  Second, in 
form, it was not a dispute between private parties, or even an action to 
enforce what are now called “public rights.”217  Rather, the proceeding 
was a prosecution by a sovereign authority against private individuals’ 
preexisting common law property rights.  Deprivation of property can 
be a criminal punishment as surely as deprivation of life or liberty.218 
Finally, there may have been apprehension that the tribunal’s 
judgments would have a preclusive effect in subsequent criminal pro-
ceedings in U.S. courts.219  If a vessel were judged to be engaged in the 
slave trade, there were no other elements needed to find the officers 
and crew guilty of slave trading.  Slave traders were simply those oper-
ating vessels engaged in the slave trade.  Concerns about the preclu-
sive effect of the mixed courts were prominently voiced by the French 
in explaining their refusal to join the treaty system: 
 To pronounce upon the legality of the seizure is to judge the ques-
tion as much as it is possible to do it . . . . His fate is thenceforward fixed. 
 
214 See United States v. Eighty-Four Boxes of Sugar, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 453, 462-63 
(1833) (requiring more than “accident or mistake” for civil forfeiture because the for-
feiture statute was considered “a highly penal law”); The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 
Wheat.) 1, 39-40 (1826) (stating that confiscation of a vessel may be proper punish-
ment for “gross violations of the law of nations on the high seas” but not for “lighter 
faults, or common negligence”). 
215 See, e.g., Strohm v. United States, 23 F. Cas. 240, 241 (C.C.D. Md. 1840) (No. 
13,539). 
216 See The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. at 40 (describing forfeiture of a vessel that at-
tacked a U.S. Navy ship in mistaken self-defense as “such harsh punishment[]” be-
cause, unlike damages, the relief was not proportionate to the harm caused). 
217 See supra text accompanying notes 43-48. 
218 See United States v. Mann, 26 F. Cas. 1153, 1154 (C.C.D.N.H. 1812) (No. 
15,718) (recognizing that fines and forfeitures could be either civil or criminal, de-
pending on the language and context of the statute). 
219 See 42 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 3029 (1823) (suggesting that mixed tribunals 
would leave defendants open to capital punishment, which was available in the United 
States upon conviction of slave trading but was not a punishment that the mixed court 
itself could impose). 
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 It matters little that the penalties which he has or has not incurred be 
determined by the code of his country, or by that of another.  When he 
has undergone the examination of the commission, it only remains to 
apply this code, or to set him at liberty; he is then in reality judged, and 
that not by his natural judges.
220
 
While preclusion in a criminal case seems far-fetched, concerns 
may have been based on the idea that judgments of international tri-
bunals to which the United States was a party were final and binding 
on U.S. courts, even in criminal cases.221  Moreover, the proposed trea-
ty may well have required by its terms that judgments of the court—
although made under a “guilty until proven innocent” standard222—
would have effect in a subsequent domestic prosecution.223 
D.  The Precedential Value of the Rejection 
Having surveyed the legal arguments against joining the slave-
trade courts in the previous sections of this Part, this final Section eva-
luates the precedential weight that should be given to these views.  
Because the constitutional opinions were expressed by the political 
branches, one may wonder to what extent the objections to the mixed 
courts were motivated by politics or other extralegal considerations.  
This Section shows that the constitutional objections were widely held 
and had significant indicia of sincerity.  At the same time, the speed 
and unanimity with which the treaty was rejected limits what one can 
 
220 Memoir of the French Government on the Slave Trade, supra note 197, at 78.  
While the U.S. rules of estoppel would likely differ from those of France, the memo 
seems to refer to a de facto, if not de jure, estoppel.  In any case, the preclusive effects 
in a subsequent criminal case of a judgment of an international mixed court in U.S. 
law are entirely unclear. 
221 This issue was recently forcefully argued with respect to the International Court 
of Justice in Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1360-65 (2008).  While the Supreme 
Court rejected the view that the ICJ’s decisions are automatically binding, it treated the 
question as one of treaty intention, to be decided on a case-by-case basis.  See id. at 1356-57. 
222 The treaty contained “equipment articles,” which allowed vessels to be seized 
on suspicion of involvement in the slave trade if they carried equipment typical of a 
slave vessel.  See Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain for the Suppres-
sion of the Slave Trade, U.S.-Gr. Brit., arts. VI–IX, Apr. 7, 1862, 12 Stat. 1225.  This 
could range from the very suspicious, such as shackles, to the potentially benign, such 
as an abundance of water and other routine supplies.  See id. art. VI.  Vessels appre-
hended with such equipment would be condemned unless they produced “clear and in-
controvertible evidence, proving to the satisfaction of the mixed court of justice, that 
. . . the vessel was employed in a lawful undertaking.”  Id. 
223 Under the terms of the treaty eventually signed by the United States, the crew 
of a condemned vessel would be presumed guilty in a subsequent domestic prosecu-
tion.  See id. art. IX (authorizing sentencing by the home country of all crew members 
condemned before the mixed courts). 
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learn from the episode.  This Section, however, also shows that the 
precedent of the slave-trade courts cannot automatically be extended 
to the areas where international criminal courts are most likely to be 
active today—for universal-jurisdiction offenses and crimes by mem-
bers of the military. 
1.  Sincerity 
The objections to Britain’s proposed slave-trade measures were 
connected to general Anglophobia and bitter feelings over Britain’s 
ongoing practice of impressing sailors from U.S. vessels.  Adams open-
ly admitted these motives in discussions with the British.224 
However, these considerations were only raised with respect to the 
right of search, not mixed commissions.  Objections to the two were 
always treated as distinct.225  The openness with which the Administra-
tion stated the policy reasons for opposing mutual search226 renders it 
unlikely that it would conjure a constitutional ground for opposing 
the mixed-courts part of the proposal.  Conversely, if the Administra-
tion contrived a constitutional objection to mixed commissions, it is 
hard to understand why it did not offer a constitutional pretext for 
opposing search.227  This is especially the case given that the right of 
search was the logically anterior issue. 
 
224 For example, Adams recounted in his diary one such discussion with Canning: 
I also went largely into the objection arising from the analogy between the 
right of visitation and search proposed to be given by the Convention, and the 
claim of Great Britain to the right of visitation and search to impress men.  
The conversation was altogether free and unreserved, the discussion invariably 
temperate . . . . [Canning] hint[ed] some regret that we should even harbor 
the sentiment that there was any analogy between them, or bring that subject 
into view at all . . . but [I] observed that it was indispensable to unfold with 
candor and sincerity all our objections to the proposed Convention. 
Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 20, 1820), supra note 113, at 189-90.  
225 See 42 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 3019 (1823) (“Our objection has been of two 
kinds; first, to the mixed commissions, as inconsistent with our Constitution; and se-
condly, to the right of search, as a dangerous precedent, liable to abuse, and odious to 
the feelings and recollections of our country.”). 
226 See id. at 3019-20 (declaring that the American government disagreed with the 
right to search American vessels because of fears of unwanted encroachment and past 
incidents of maltreatment). 
227 Fabricated arguments are presumably always available.  By analogy to the non-
delegation argument against mixed commissions, the Administration might have said 
that using British cruisers to police violations of American anti-slave-trade laws would 
infringe on the President’s power to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”  
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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Moreover, the types of political concerns that incited opposition 
to the general project228 did not apply to the mixed-courts proposal, 
which would neither bolster British naval dominance nor carry associ-
ations of impressment.229  Thus, only a strong general Anglophobia 
could color officials’ judgment of the mixed-commission question.  
Certainly, Monroe and some members of his Cabinet may have been 
visceral Anglophobes,230 but the same could not be said of Adams, 
Wirt, Thompson, Rush, Gallatin, and many members of the House. 
A number of other circumstances suggest that the constitutional 
arguments were sincere.  The private papers of Adams, Gallatin, Mon-
roe, Rush, and others betray no ulterior motives.231  On the contrary, 
they discuss the constitutional issues with nothing but seriousness.  
Within the Cabinet, Adams was particularly hostile to any concession 
on the right of search.  Yet when the mixed-commission issue was 
raised, he challenged Wirt’s Article III arguments even though they 
would tend to defeat participation in the search project.  This suggests 
that, at least on this issue, Adams would not have manufactured con-
stitutional arguments to support the outcomes he desired.  Another 
indicator of the sincerity of the constitutional objections is the price 
the Administration was willing to pay to maintain it.  London repeat-
edly signaled its willingness to make substantial concessions on other 
important fronts in exchange for mixed courts.232 
 
228 Again, these concerns stemmed from a reluctance to concede anything that 
might confirm Britain’s role as the police of the oceans or allow Britain to abuse the 
right of search to harass U.S. vessels and impress sailors. 
229 The commissions may also have been reminiscent of the British military and 
admiralty tribunals established by the British in the colonies in the decades before the 
Revolutionary War.  These courts were one of the colonists’ major grievances.  See THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 20-21 (U.S. 1776) (criticizing King George III 
“[f]or depriving us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury” and “[f]or trans-
porting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended Offences”); JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, 
THE JUBILEE OF THE CONSTITUTION:  A DISCOURSE 8-9 (New York, Samuel Colman 
1839) (“Parliament . . . in their omnipotence, instead of trial by jury and the Habeas 
Corpus, enacted admiralty courts in England to try Americans . . . .”).  However, there is 
no indication that these played any role in the mixed-commission question, and it seems 
unlikely that they would have:  five decades is a long time for political memory.  
230 See, e.g., REPORT ON RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN (Nov. 29, 1811) (describ-
ing Calhoun as an open Anglophobe), reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 
66-67 (Robert L. Meriwether ed., 1959). 
231 Adams noted in his diaries, for instance, when he took a position in public that 
he privately disagreed with.  See, e.g., Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Nov. 17, 
1821) (recalling having told Canning that the President lacked the power to extradite 
suspects to Britain even “though [he] was not entirely satisfied that there was a want of 
authority”), in 5 ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 104, at 400.  He did not do so here. 
232 See supra subsection II.C.2. 
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Moreover, no one in Congress, the Administration, or the press233 
suggested that mixed commissions would be constitutional.  There 
were certainly many quarters from which objections to unsupportable 
constitutional arguments could have been raised.  The Congress—
with some Framers still in it—did not shy away from constitutional de-
bate.  For example, just a few years before the British proposed the 
slave-trade convention, disagreement over the scope of the treaty 
power led to a prolonged standoff between the House and Senate on 
a commercial treaty with Britain.  The dispute centered on the 
House’s role in treaties intended to have domestic affect.  Bold consti-
tutional interpretations were warmly advanced by both sides.234 
While in that episode the House was fighting for its own power, 
doubts about the slave-trade treaty would not have been suppressed.  
The House did not share the Administration’s bias against naval co-
operation with Britain.  Nonetheless, members of the House consi-
dered mixed courts an insurmountable problem.235  Nowhere was a 
more favorable view of the overall British enterprise taken than in the 
House committees.236  Yet these committees considered mixed courts a 
constitutional impossibility.  Even the Society of Friends, which strong-
ly supported Britain’s international slave-trade campaign and bom-
 
233 The diplomatic correspondence with Britain was covered in the press, as was 
the establishment of mixed courts with other countries.  See, e.g., The Slave Trade—No. 
III, FRANKLIN GAZETTE (Phila.), Aug. 18, 1821 (describing “judicial arrangements for 
the execution of this project of the right of search”).  The Administration’s constitu-
tional stance, however, apparently did not attract comment. 
234 The House argued that any treaty that would operate within Congress’s enu-
merated powers—and certainly within those areas of legislation that must originate 
with the House—had to be passed by the entire legislature.  The Senate claimed that 
all treaties, regardless of subject matter, were self-executing.  See generally WILLIAM 
RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 58-70 (Phil-
adelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825) (discussing the rationale behind the treaty-making 
requirements and noting the heated nature of the debate concerning the houses’ 
roles); Parry, supra note 69 (discussing the debate in a broader historical context). 
235 Decades later, Charles Mercer, the long-serving chairman of the House slave-
trade committee and one of the most ardent opponents of the trade, indulged in re-
criminations with Adams over responsibility for the failure of the 1824 convention. 
While Mercer charged the Monroe Administration with being unenthusiastic about the 
treaty, and perhaps hoping for its failure in the Senate, he did not cast any doubt on 
the validity of the objection to mixed commissions.  See Charles Fenton Mercer, Ad-
dress at the Anniversary of the American Colonization Society ( Jan. 18, 1853), in 29 
THE AFRICAN REPOSITORY 153-56 (1853). 
236 See 2 REG. DEB. 2257 (1826) (speech of Daniel Webster before the House of Rep-
resentatives) (observing that the resolutions of the House, unlike the committee reports, 
did not recommend right of search and that, with the “negotiation having been con-
cluded, in conformity to the opinions expressed, not, indeed, by the House, but by the 
committee, the treaty, when laid before the Senate, was rejected by that body”). 
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barded Washington with petitions, does not appear to have engaged 
the mixed-courts issue.237 
Potential critics certainly had time to respond.  The original nego-
tiations with Britain were active for a period of nine years—hardly a 
passing episode.  Britain periodically raised the right of search again 
with the United States in the ensuing decades.238  Yet it never again 
raised the question of mixed courts, apparently understanding that 
issue to be off the table. 
2.  Limits 
The rejection of the slave-trade court has some limitations as a us-
able precedent, limitations that result from the very circumstances 
that make the episode compelling.  For one, nothing happened.  Be-
cause the Administration regarded the treaty as unconstitutional, 
there was no opportunity for the Senate to debate the matter.  Since it 
was posterior to the equally controversial search question, the courts 
received less consideration than they otherwise might have.  Because 
the idea died stillborn, no formal public discussion of the idea oc-
curred.  Precisely because the commissions were rejected out of hand 
by everyone who considered the issue, there is no authoritative ac-
count of why they are unconstitutional.  Rather, there is a grab bag of 
reasons, and it is not clear which were decisive.  This weakens the epi-
sode’s precedential force—much like a Supreme Court decision with-
out a single majority opinion—but does not leave one free to ignore 
the unanimous outcome. 
The arguments first advanced by Wirt vary greatly in their plausi-
bility.  And there is something of a moving target in Adams’s repeated 
explanations to Canning.239  The multiplication of constitutional ar-
guments of varying quality against the commissions may cast doubt on 
their seriousness.  On the other hand, this could be read as an almost 
 
237 See, e.g., Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams ( June 4, 1824) (recording that 
Quaker lobbyists expressed “their great anxiety for the suppression of the slave-trade” 
in negotiations), in 6 ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 104, at 374, 375; cf. The Slave Trade 
Treaty, BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Apr. 29, 1862 (presenting with minimal comment 
the language of the treaty). 
238 During the debate over the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, the early diplomacy of 
the Monroe Administration was reviewed and discussed by Adams, Webster, Ingersoll, 
and others, with no suggestion of a change of views on the constitutional question.  
Adams did, however, feel compelled to admit with “bitterness” that the earlier negotia-
tions had effectively conceded a limited right of search.  CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 424 (1842). 
239 See infra note 243.  
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instinctive reaction that the proposal somehow contradicted the spirit 
of the Constitution as well as the letter—even if one could not put a 
finger on precisely which letter.  As Adams put it, the proposal was 
“adverse to the elementary principles and indispensable securities of 
individual rights interwoven in all the political institutions of this 
country.”240 
3.  Universal Jurisdiction 
The proposed slave-trade courts may not answer all questions 
raised by modern international criminal courts because the conduct 
within the jurisdiction of the former was not universally cognizable at 
the time (piracy was the only universal offense).  Many of the crimes 
that today’s international criminal courts deal with, however, are un-
iversally cognizable.  This might make a constitutional difference to 
the ability of Congress to participate in the creation of international 
courts for such crimes.241  Adams conceded that if the slave trade be-
came a universal-jurisdiction offense under the law of nations, there 
would be no problem with trial before a foreign tribunal, saying “[s]o 
long as the trade shall not be recognised as piracy by the law of na-
tions, we cannot, according to our Constitution, subject our citizens to 
trial for being engaged in it, by any tribunal other than those of the 
United States.”242  Because universal crimes fell within the jurisdiction 
of all nations, these cases would essentially be ones of extradition.243  
 
240 Letter from John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning (Dec. 30, 1820), in 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 109, at 76.  
241 The universal status of a crime was thought to make a constitutional difference to 
the converse constitutional question:  America’s ability to punish crimes committed extra-
territorially by foreigners.  Thus, Congress did not think it could punish foreign slave 
trading until that offense became well accepted as a universal crime in international law.  
See Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and the Limits of Universal Jurisdic-
tion, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 195 (2009).  This limitation came from the “Define and Pu-
nish” Clause of the Constitution, and it is harder to see how this could authorize the limi-
tation of the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens.  See id. at 167-68, 198-200. 
242 42 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 3027-28 (1823); see also id. at 3029 (letter from 
John Quincy Adams to Alexander H. Everett) (arguing that because slave trading was 
still technically “considered as of inferior magnitude [to piracy], the Constitution of 
the United States forbade the submission of it, when charged upon their citizens, to 
any foreign tribunal”). 
243 Adams went still further by arguing that even for universal-jurisdiction crimes, 
the trial must be held in the domestic courts of the offender’s nation.  In this view, 
universal jurisdiction refers simply to enforcement jurisdiction—the ability to make 
arrests—rather than to adjudicative jurisdiction.  This is a gross misstatement of inter-
national law then and now.  Considerations of comity, practicality, and national self-
interest ensured the dominance of “complementarity”—giving precedence to fora with 
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Since U.S. pirates could face the alternative of a purely foreign tri-
bunal, providing a forum with U.S. participation would be preferable 
even for the defendant.244  Yet if universal jurisdiction makes a consti-
tutional difference to the extent that it allows for the reduction of in-
dividual rights, it is not a label that can simply be slapped on an of-
fense without corresponding to an objective state of affairs in 
international law.245 
Less weight should be given to these views than to the general 
constitutional opposition to international courts for the slave trade 
because Adams was alone in expressing the former.  Unlike the 
broader questions, these views were not vetted by the Cabinet or ap-
proved of by Congress, though they also did not provoke any contro-
versy.  The slave trade did not become universally cognizable during 
the period in question, and thus the idea remained hypothetical. 
4.  Offenses by Service Members 
The slave-trade-courts proposal was designed to try civilians, and 
thus its rejection does not, in the strictest sense, speak to the poten-
tially distinguishable case of service members.  Members of the mili-
tary are subject to a distinct system of justice, which does not have ju-
ries, Article III judges, or Supreme Court review.  One could argue 
that submitting cases involving military personnel to an international 
court that also lacks these features would not deprive them of any rights 
they currently enjoy.246   
 
traditional jurisdictional ties.  Adams was wrong that a foreign trial was not countenanced 
by international law.  His insistence on this point betrays his aversion to British justice, 
and it may cast some doubt on the sincerity of his constitutional arguments.  However, 
unlike his constitutional objections, Adams’s expressed positions on universal jurisdiction 
were not previewed or accepted by the rest of the Administration or Congress. 
244 See Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 123 (outlining U.S. efforts to include standards 
of due process in the ICC). 
245 See Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the Article I Horizon:  Congress’s Enumerated Powers 
and Universal Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1219-23 (2009) (show-
ing that Congress’s power to “define . . . [p]iracies . . . and offenses against the [l]aw of 
[n]ations,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, does not allow it to invent such definitions 
unrestrained by objective international law). 
246 A similar argument prevailed in In re Ross, where the Court upheld the trial of 
Americans in non-Christian countries, before a U.S. consul, without any procedural 
protections of constitutional rights.  See 140 U.S. 453, 461, 480 (1891).  Had the United 
States not entered into treaties with foreign countries allowing for such consular 
courts, the American citizens would have been tried by local courts where they would 
have enjoyed even fewer protections.  Id. at 465.  
 Given the focus of modern international criminal courts on crimes committed 
during armed conflict, this exception could be quite significant. 
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5.  Foreign Territory 
U.S. merchant vessels had the legal status of U.S. territory.247  It is 
not clear, however, whether this factor played a role in the debate, 
and it was not mentioned by anyone at the time.  While the extraterri-
torial status of ships was a well-known fact,248 its application was not 
straightforward.  Ships were only constructively part of the territory of 
the countries whose flag they flew.249  It is thus not clear whether U.S. 
ships were regarded as equivalent to U.S. territory in the relevant con-
stitutional senses. 
Under both international law and American law, vessels were nev-
er fully treated as part of their flag state’s territory in every respect.250  
As early as the Robins case, fine distinctions were made between juris-
diction over vessels and the literal notion of territory.251  Whether 
ships count as territory for particular constitutional purposes is a sepa-
rate question, the answer to which is unclear.252 
 
247 See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 621 (1818) (“The jurisdic-
tion of a nation over its public ships is exclusive every where [sic] . . . .”). 
248 But cf. In re Ross, 140 U.S. at 464 (“The deck of a private American vessel, it is 
true, is considered for many purposes constructively as territory of the United States, 
yet persons on board of such vessels, whether officers, sailors, or passengers, cannot 
invoke the protection of the provisions referred to until brought within the actual ter-
ritorial boundaries of the United States.”).  This may just mean that the Court thought 
habeas and other rights could not be procedurally exercised on a ship because it was out-
side of the jurisdiction of any district court.  If the Court meant that substantive rights 
did not apply on board the ship, it would represent a further—and unsupported—
extension of Ross’s already problematic holding that the Constitution has no applica-
bility to governmental action abroad.  
249 See United States v. Smiley, 27 F. Cas. 1132, 1134 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 
16,317) (“The constructive territory of the United States embraces vessels sailing under 
their flag; wherever they go they carry the laws of their country, and for a violation of 
them their officers and men may be subjected to punishment.”). 
250 See, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 123 (1923) (“The jurisdiction 
which it is intended to describe arises out of the nationality of the ship, as established 
by her domicile, registry and use of the flag, and partakes more of the characteristics of 
personal than of territorial sovereignty.”); Johnson v. Twenty-One Bales, 13 F. Cas. 855, 
862 (C.C.N.Y. 1814) (No. 7417) (“The notion that vessels must be considered as part 
of the territory of a nation, is antiquated and exploded.”). 
251 See United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 838 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175) (“To 
suppose that Vattel mean[t] . . . that the ships of a nation are, with respect to the space 
of water they cover on the ocean, its territory as to jurisdiction, . . . as completely as its 
lands or rivers are, is [incorrect].”). 
252 See, e.g., Cunard, 262 U.S. at 121-23 (holding that despite the “metaphor” of 
flag-state territoriality, the Eighteenth Amendment did not apply to U.S. ships on the 
high seas); Lam Mow v. Nagle, 24 F.2d 316, 317-18 (9th Cir. 1928) (holding that a U.S. 
merchant vessel was not U.S. “territory” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
birth-citizenship provision).  Interestingly, in the case of the only slave trader ever ex-
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If the British sought mixed courts to punish conduct by Ameri-
cans in what amounted to U.S. territory, it would strengthen the ar-
gument for unconstitutionality.  Article III requires a jury trial for all 
“[c]rimes . . . not committed within any State.”253  Presumably, this 
would include U.S. vessels on the high seas.  Moreover, while Con-
gress can set the “Place” for the trial, the textual location of the provi-
sion suggests that the trial would have to be before an Article III 
court.254  This helps explain why Article III was discussed more than 
the Sixth Amendment—it is the direct source of the jury-trial right 
here.  There may also be an associated personal right to an Article III 
judge when the Article III jury provision is being invoked.255  In other 
words, crimes outside any state may be an interesting situation where 
concerns based on the use of non–Article III courts merge with or are 
subsumed by the argument for preservation of individual rights.256  
The territoriality of vessels may also justify Adams and subsequent sta-
tesmen apparently treating the right to a criminal jury as more impor-
tant than the right to a civil one257—Article III’s jury provision only 
mentions the former. 
In short, while the argument against the slave-trade courts would 
have more force if limited to U.S. territory, it is not clear whether U.S. 
ships had the literal status of “islands.”  Thus, it is not clear if the slave-
trade-court precedent was limited to cases arising within U.S. territory.  
Certainly Congress and the courts acted as if crimes aboard ships im-
plicated Article III.  There is also no direct evidence that U.S. officials 
based their arguments on this factor, though it would go far to explain 
some obscure points. 
IV.  CIVIL WAR AND CIVIL SUITS 
A surprising epilogue to the story of the slave-trade courts oc-
curred at the height of the Civil War.  The British had never flagged 
in their desire to conclude a slave-trade treaty.  Throughout the 1850s, 
their efforts to search U.S. vessels upon suspicion of slave trading were 
strongly and successfully resisted by Washington.  However, during the 
 
ecuted by the United States, the court suggested that birth on a U.S. vessel would help 
determine one’s status as a U.S. citizen under pre–Fourteenth Amendment principles.  
See United States v. Gordon, 25 F. Cas. 1364, 1365 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 15,231). 
253 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.3. 
254 See id. 
255 See supra notes 193-194 and accompanying text. 
256 See supra notes 195-196.  
257 See, e.g., text infra accompanying note 306. 
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Civil War, London again proffered a draft convention featuring a 
right of search and mixed courts.258  The Lincoln Administration, in a 
significant diplomatic reversal, accepted the searches and commis-
sions with almost no haggling.259  Yet the Administration refused to 
repudiate the core constitutional principle advanced by Adams and 
his colleagues:  the impermissibility of granting international courts 
with criminal jurisdiction over Americans.  By stressing the limited ju-
risdiction of the new tribunals, the Lincoln Administration appeased 
the British without openly offending the Constitution. 
A.  Quick Negotiations 
In contrast to the protracted three-way wrangling among Britain, 
the Administration, and Congress in the 1820s, the entire process dur-
ing the Civil War took only a few months.  After sounding out the 
American officials in 1861, the British formally renewed their proposal 
on February 28, 1862.  This time, they sent a completed draft treaty.260  
Secretary of State Seward immediately embraced the proposal, nego-
tiating only minor changes.  Lincoln signed the Lyons-Seward Trea-
ty,261 as it became known, on April 7 of the same year.  The Senate met 
in closed session, and no report of the treaty was made to the press 
until it was ratified, unanimously,262 just three weeks after signature.  
The treaty had spent less than three days on the floor and four in the 
Foreign Relations Committee.263 
Much had changed politically to make the long-rejected proposal 
acceptable.  Most importantly, the treaty was a gesture to appease 
London.264  British-U.S. relations were at a point of crisis unprece-
dented since the War of 1812.  The British seemed poised to recog-
 
258 See A. Taylor Milne, The Lyons-Seward Treaty of 1862, 38 AM. HIST. REV. 511, 
512 (1933). 
259 Id. at 513-14. 
260 See id. at 513. 
261 Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain for the Suppression of the 
Slave Trade, Apr. 7, 1862, 12 Stat. 1225 [hereinafter Lyons-Seward Treaty]. 
262 See WARREN S. HOWARD, AMERICAN SLAVERS AND THE FEDERAL LAW, 1837–1862, 
at 61 (1963). 
263 SUMNER, supra note 158, at 474.  
264 See Milne, supra note 258, at 511 (“To conclude with Great Britain a convention 
of the kind she had so frequently suggested was also a means of enlisting British sym-
pathy for the North.”). 
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nize the Confederacy as an independent sovereign.265  Reacting to this 
development, the Union seized Southern diplomats from a British 
vessel.266  The British then considered an embargo on saltpeter, an es-
sential ingredient in gunpowder, to the Union,267 for a moment bring-
ing the nations to the brink of war in late 1861.268  Reconciliation with 
Britain was of paramount importance, and a slave-trade treaty was a 
cheap gesture.  The treaty was also seen by contemporary commenta-
tors as one of many easy moves against anything associated with the 
South’s “peculiar institution.”269  Seward wrote, with equal measures of 
exaggeration and self-congratulation, that had such a treaty been 
made earlier, there would have been no civil war.270  This was a perfect 
confluence of events for the passage of the Act.  Indeed, its backers 
recognized it could not have passed at any other time.271 
B.  The Constitutional Argument 
Despite the favorable political environment, the constitutional is-
sues implicated by the Lyons-Seward Treaty could not be ignored.  
They were addressed by Senator Charles Sumner, a leading abolition-
ist who made the treaty’s passage his personal cause, in a long speech 
shortly before the final vote.272  After reviewing the history of British 
efforts to obtain such a treaty, Sumner turned to the constitutional is-
 
265 See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM:  THE CIVIL WAR ERA 387 
(1988) (“[T]he British government announced an action that misled Americans on both 
sides of the Potomac to anticipate imminent diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy.”). 
266 Id. at 389-90. 
267 See id. at 390 (“The [British] government clamped an embargo on all [salt-
peter] shipments to the United States until the [diplomat-seizure] crisis was resolved.”). 
268 See id. (“War seemed imminent.”). 
269 The New Slave-Trade Treaty, TIMES (London), May 24, 1862, at 10 (“To hold over 
the South the fear of abolition is the obvious policy of Washington, and this fear will be 
best aroused by a show of decision in dealing with all questions relating to Slavery.”), as 
reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1862, at 2. 
270 See Diary Entry of William H. Seward (Apr. 8, 1862) (“Had such a treaty been 
made in 1808, there would now have been no sedition here . . . .”), in 5 THE WORKS OF 
WILLIAM H. SEWARD 52, 52 (George Baker ed., Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1890) 
[hereinafter SEWARD]. 
271 See Letter from Lord Lyons to Lord Russell (Apr. 7, 1862) (noting Seward’s 
statement that, “while confident of obtaining the Ratification of the Senate at this 
moment, he [could] []not feel so certain that he should be able to do so a month 
hence”), in Milne, supra note 258, at 523.  
272 See Milne, supra note 258, at 514 (“Charles Sumner, who piloted [the treaty] 
through the Senate, had brushed aside the old contention that American courts on for-
eign soil would be unconstitutional . . . .”); see also SUMNER, supra note 158, at 474 (“[O]n 
motion of Mr. Sumner, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution of ratification.”). 
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sues.  Sumner said that in Adams’s day, “the question was less under-
stood.”273  He cited Supreme Court decisions in intervening years that 
affirmed the constitutionality of the Territorial Courts.274  These pre-
cedents, he argued, undercut the formalistic arguments about the ex-
clusivity of Article III and the need for impeachable judges.  Just as 
particular Article I powers authorized territorial courts, the treaty 
power authorized the mixed commission.275 
Next, Sumner cited the wide use of international commissions dat-
ing back to the Jay Treaty, noting that their constitutionality was un-
questioned.276  Finally, the senator appealed to practical considera-
tions.  Given the ubiquity of mixed courts in international law, the 
United States would be left behind and “isolated among nations” if it 
could not participate in such arrangements.277  The United States, the 
argument continued, should not be cramped in its foreign relations 
due to a “discarded technicality.”278 
Sumner’s invocation of territorial and military courts does not re-
but Adams’s objections.  In both, habeas corpus and mandamus is 
available, and the President may pardon.  In the territorial courts, ap-
peals can be taken to the Supreme Court.279  The courts-martial juris-
diction only extends to members of the military or those closely asso-
ciated with it.280 
Sumner’s argument about a superior understanding—that “the 
question was less understood” by Adams—is weak.  The earlier de-
cisionmakers included participants in the founding.  In addition, 
 
273 Sumner, supra note 158, at 483. 
274 See id. at 483 & n.2 (citing Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 
(1828)).  Seward also mentioned the “extra-constitutional” nature of courts martial, 
though he did not mention the cases that upheld them.  See id. at 483 (“[C]ourts mar-
tial are also extra-constitutional, standing on the war power and the practice of na-
tions.”).  In the intervening years, the Court had, however, upheld military courts mar-
tial.  See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 82-83 (1857). 
275 See Sumner, supra note 158, at 483 (“Like Territorial courts, mixed courts are plainly 
extra-constitutional, standing on the treaty power and the practice of nations . . . .”). 
276 See id. at 484 (“The Jay Commission was originally criticized . . . . But nobody 
now doubts that this commission was proper.”). 
277 Id. at 485. 
278 Id. 
279 See Pfander, supra note 25, at 766 (stating that “federal courts have used habeas 
to review courts-martial, mandamus to review territorial court judgments”). 
280 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1957) (plurality opinion) (finding that 
dependents accompanying military personnel overseas were not subject to the jurisdic-
tion of courts martial); see also Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 107, 122 (1866) 
(finding that a trial by military commission of a U.S. civilian who “never had been in 
the military or naval service” was unconstitutional). 
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Sumner did not point to any new development contributing to this 
understanding.  Territorial courts had been around for over three 
decades when the slave courts were first proposed.  Monroe, Adams, 
and many in Congress had been involved in their creation.  While the 
Supreme Court had not yet upheld these courts, presumably Congress 
and the Administration thought they were constitutional.281  Other-
wise, it is hard to imagine they would have kept creating them.  Simi-
larly, the argument from the Jay Treaty was hardly a new one. 
While Sumner may not have refuted Adams’s views, he may not 
have had to.  At the very start of the speech, he noted a crucial distinc-
tion between the jurisdiction of the courts proposed forty years earlier 
and those created by the 1862 treaty:  the constitutional objections to 
the former were “mitigated” because the latter gave the court jurisdic-
tion over the vessel but not the crew.282  Sumner appears to have rec-
ognized that the crux of the earlier objections was the understanding 
that the court might exercise criminal jurisdiction.283  Arguably, the 
1862 treaty’s forfeiture provisions still amounted to criminal jurisdic-
tion, and Sumner simply chose to characterize it differently to duck 
what he understood to be a constitutional difficulty. 
C.  A Court with No Cases 
The constitutionality of the tribunals was never tested in court.  
The U.S. involvement in the trade had ceased before the judges 
reached their posts a year after the treaty was ratified.284  The Ameri-
can slave trade had been hurt by the increasingly vigorous enforce-
 
281 Decisions of the Court before Canter had already implied that Congress could 
properly give judicial functions to the territorial courts.  See supra note 27 and accom-
panying text.   Similarly, the constitutionality of courts martial was generally accepted by 
the early 1820s, though it had not been confirmed by the Court.  As Rawle explained, 
 There is [a] species of courts having a special jurisdiction, from which trial 
by jury is also excluded, yet whose power extends to . . . imprisonment, per-
sonal chastisement, and even loss of life.  It will be at once perceived that we 
allude to courts martial. 
 Although not expressly mentioned in the constitution, the power to insti-
tute them is unquestionably given by the authority vested in congress to make 
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces . . . .   
RAWLE, supra note 234, at 209-10. 
282 Sumner, supra note 158, at 483 (arguing that the objections voiced by John 
Quincy Adams were now “wholly superficial and untenable”). 
283 See Milne, supra note 258, at 513 (describing Seward’s subterfuge in portraying 
the right to search as an American initiative rather than capitulation to a British request). 
284 See HOWARD, supra note 262, at 62-64. 
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ment of British domestic laws before the start of the war285 and the 
blockade of Southern ports in 1861.  It was becoming clear that a Un-
ion victory would end slavery altogether, thereby making slave impor-
tation financially risky.286  Finally, increased Spanish enforcement 
around Cuba did much of the rest of the treaty’s work.287  While the 
treaty no doubt had some deterrent effect immediately after its ratifi-
cation, it is clear that the trade would not have survived the war. 
Instead of demonstrating America’s amenability to having its citi-
zens tried before international human rights courts, the mixed com-
missions turned out to be prototypical sinecures, hearing no cases at 
all.288  The first U.S. members of the international human rights tri-
bunal collected a salary, without working, for seven years before Con-
gress noticed.289  On March 3, 1869, the legislature requested that the 
President renegotiate the Lyons-Seward Treaty.  The courts were ter-
minated on June 3, 1870.290 
D.  The Precedential Value of the Acceptance 
In 1862, the mixed courts were approved without hesitation.  The 
treaty was eagerly negotiated by the Lincoln Administration and over-
whelmingly adopted by the Senate.  Just as the unconstitutionality of 
the commissions was broadly accepted in previous decades, now the 
opposite was the case.  This may seem to cast a different light on the 
earlier history.  Several circumstances, however, weaken the force of 
the Lyons-Seward Treaty as a constitutional precedent.  (It should be 
 
285 See Bethell, supra note 79, at 91-92 (reviewing the success of the British navy 
and the British vice-admiralty courts in suppressing the slave trade in the years leading 
up to the war). This included the much-publicized, first-ever execution of a slave trad-
er in February 1862.  See supra note 188. 
286 See HOWARD, supra note 262, at 64-65. 
287 See id. at 65; see also Milne, supra note 258, at 516 (noting Spain’s increased ef-
forts to suppress the slave trade). 
288 HOWARD, supra note 262, at 62-63. 
289 The salary was roughly the same as that of a congressman at the time.  Howev-
er, the Freetown and Cape postings were hazardous duty assignments, with death and 
illness rampant among the commissioners.  As one senator put it, “these Courts 
. . . have accomplished absolutely nothing for the suppression of the slave trade or any 
other object, as I know from a member of the Court.”  Fortieth Congress, Third Session, 
Consular Appropriations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1869, at 1 (quoting Sen. Patterson).  Anoth-
er senator noted that “[t]he question before the Senate was simply whether certain 
gentlemen should be supported out of the people’s money without doing anything to 
earn it.”  Id. (quoting Sen. Hendricks). 
290 See SUMNER, supra note 158, at 486 (chronicling the end of the mixed courts). 
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recalled that the reversal of 1862 was not a complete one, as the li-
mited jurisdiction over the courts was stressed.291) 
First, the treaty was an exceptional wartime measure.292  This is evi-
dent from the marked reversal made on the related issue of search.  The 
British had still been asking for a right of search in the late 1850s.  In-
deed, General Lewis Cass, the Secretary of State from 1857 to 1860, re-
sisted the British position on search perhaps more vigorously than any 
previous minister, and an intensive correspondence finally convinced 
Britain to abandon its claims to a search right.293  In 1859, the United 
States announced in the strongest terms that it would never agree to 
search by British vessels.294  Given this massive opposition, the ease with 
which it was conceded in 1862 by even the most antisearch senators sug-
gests something about the exceptional nature of the moment.295 
Second, the timing and process of the treaty’s ratification gives 
reason to doubt the quality of the constitutional deliberation.  The 
treaty was rushed through the Senate at a time when many other 
pressing matters occupied its attention and when other constitutional-
ly questionable measures proliferated.  The Senate was not likely to 
stand on principle in a matter that could grant an immediate and vital 
advantage in the war.  The constitutional issues were touched on brief-
ly and incompletely.296  Sumner ignored the key arguments from the 
 
291 See infra Section V.A. 
292 See SOULSBY, supra note 12, at 174-76. 
293 See 3 A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 327, at 
142-46 (Francis Wharton ed., Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1887). 
294 See id. § 327, at 145-46. 
295 See Letter from Horatio J. Perry to William H. Seward ( July 11, 1862) (report-
ing that a Spanish minister was “much surprised” by reports of the treaty given that the 
United States had been “combatting [sic] that principle so long”), in 1 U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 509, 509 (Washington, D.C., Gov’t 
Printing Office 1862). 
296 Strangely, although the unanimous vote on the treaty occurred in closed ses-
sion, when legislation carrying the treaty into effect was before the Senate just a few 
months later, five senators voted against it out of “[c]onstitutional scruples.”  News from 
Washington, The Treaty for Suppressing the Slave-Trade, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1862, at 4.  
Said one senator, “I do not object to the suppression of the African slave-trade, but I 
do not believe that this Government has the constitutional right to establish any such 
court.  I think the treaty ought not to have been adopted.”  SUMNER, supra note 158, at 
486 (recording the statement of Senator Saulsbury). 
 It is not clear whether these senators had opposed the treaty initially; perhaps they 
had abstained from the vote.  Cf. id. at 485 (recording Sumner’s surprise at the un-
animous ratification of the treaty.)  The objectors were a group of mostly Northern 
Democrats highly critical of abolition and, in some cases, of Lincoln’s policy more 
generally.  One of them, Senator Bayard, later lost his Senate seat for refusing to take a 
loyalty oath that he also regarded as unconstitutional. 
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1820s and based his constitutional argument largely on needing con-
stitutional flexibility to realize vital foreign-policy goals. 
The treaty may not have been contemplated to have practical ef-
fect.  While it may not have been certain that the courts would hear 
absolutely no cases, it was foreseeable.297  Seward himself had noted in 
his official correspondence that the slave trade had almost completely 
ceased, and in March 1862 the blockade of the South was complete.298  
The Confederacy had banned the slave trade in its Constitution.299  
And it must have been understood that a Northern victory would 
make the treaty entirely moot while a Southern one would make it 
unenforceable.  To the senators it may have been largely an expressive 
measure.300 
The treaty was criticized by contemporaries—including some sen-
ators.301  To be sure, most of the critics were Northern Democrats gen-
erally suspicious of the Lincoln Administration.302  But the potentially 
cooler post-war commentary stressed that the treaty was a wartime 
measure not necessarily applicable to calmer times.303  A generation 
 
297 See A NORTHERN MAN, THE DIPLOMATIC YEAR:  BEING A REVIEW OF MR. SE-
WARD’S FOREIGN CORRESPONDENCE OF 1862, at 36 (2d ed., Philadelphia, John Camp-
bell 1863) (arguing that the treaty would be “fruitless”). 
298 See William H. Seward, The Assurance of Victory, Remarks at a Serenade in Re-
joicing over the Reelection of President Lincoln (Nov. 10, 1864) (“The first year of the 
war suppressed the African slave trade in the United States.”), in 5 SEWARD, supra note 
270, at 514. 
299 CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA art. 9 § 1. 
300 See Sumner, supra note 158, at 485 (arguing that ratification would be seen by 
foreign nations as an “open pledge to Human Rights,” while “the Rebels” would see it 
as “a new sign of the national purpose”). 
301 See supra note 296.  The favorable coverage of the treaty in the Northern press 
made little or no mention of the mixed courts and the constitutional issues they raised.  
Search, which had been actively contested for decades, was seen as the essence of the 
treaty.  This was consistent with the focus of earlier discussions of the British program.  
See, e.g., A New Anti-Slave-Trade Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1862, at 4 (noting that the 
treaty as passed by the Foreign Relations Committee had not been made public, pre-
venting a debate on its merits). 
302 See, e.g., A NORTHERN MAN, supra note 297, at 29-37 (“Mr. Seward may think 
nothing of it, but this reversal of history, this renunciation of . . . ancient policy, gives a 
sharp pang.”).  The pamphlet focuses its ire on the concession of search.  While the 
author also objects to the mixed commissions, see id. at 31, he treats them as a side is-
sue because with the slave trade already over, they would not hear any cases—yet the 
right of search would still exist.  See id. at 35-36 (characterizing the agreement as “a 
dark shadow that may yet harm America”). 
303 One subsequent commentator wrote that “there was a general impression in 
the United States that it was quite doubtful whether such a tribunal could render an 
effective judgment” but did not explain how this impression was manifest.  See Simeon 
E. Baldwin, The Proposed Trial of the Former Kaiser, 29 YALE L.J. 75, 77 (1919). 
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later, Secretary of State Thomas Bayard, in official correspondence, 
dismissed the treaty as having been adopted in “peculiar circums-
tances” and not suggestive of general principles.304  If one discounts 
the original objections to the commissions as colored by anti-British 
sentiment, the subsequent abandonment of those objections should 
be at least equally discounted as being motivated by the opposite con-
siderations. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN COURTS AND DEBATES 
This Part explores the significance of the slave-trade-court story 
for current constitutional questions.  It first asks whether any lessons 
can be drawn from the rejection of the courts from 1818 to 1861, giv-
en the ultimate acceptance of slave-trade courts.  Section V.A shows 
that the Civil War acceptance was not inconsistent with the positions 
taken by earlier administrations.  At all times there was consensus that 
criminal tribunals would be unconstitutional.  Section V.B discusses 
how various international tribunals would fare under the constitution-
al test that emerges in Section V.A and finds that many international 
courts would be acceptable.  Section V.C finds that the ICC would run 
afoul of the principles consistently articulated by the U.S. government 
throughout the nineteenth century.  It concludes by explaining how 
the ICC’s nonreservation clause prevents the United States from join-
ing with respect to those parts of the jurisdiction that would be consti-
tutional.  Section V.D. discusses an important modern argument in 
favor of the constitutional allocation of the ICC—that it should be re-
garded simply as a form of extradition and, thus, not constitutionally 
problematic.  The slave-trade-court episode suggests three important 
differences between regular extradition and sending U.S. citizens to 
international courts for non-universal-jurisdiction offenses; this sec-
tion explores the differences.  Finally, Section V.E discusses what the 
slave-trade-court episode reveals about the possible resolution of two 
other major constitutional questions:  whether there are any constitu-
 
304 Letter from Thomas Bayard to Messrs. Sawyer & Spooner (Apr. 19, 1886), in 2 
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 948 (1906).  Secretary Tho-
mas Bayard, a former senator himself, was the son of the senator James Bayard who 
had originally opposed the treaty, and was a prominent “Peace Democrat” during the 
war.  He opposed secession and is generally credited for keeping Delaware in the Un-
ion, but at the same time he challenged most aspects of Lincoln’s response to the cri-
sis.  Thus, his narrow view of the treaty’s significance is hardly surprising, and it high-
lights how much of the response to the treaty broke along the highly fraught political 
lines of the Civil War.   
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tional limitations on the treaty power, and the extent to which Con-
gress can domestically create non–Article III courts. 
A.  Reconciling the Precedents 
The U.S. response to mixed courts for the slave trade consists of 
two contradictory precedents:  the rejection of them as unconstitu-
tional from 1818 to 1861 and a sudden reversal in 1861 that resulted 
in an entirely unused court from 1863 to 1870.  One might ask wheth-
er such confused history can add up to anything.  This Section argues 
that the earlier rejectionist position seems to have quantitatively and 
qualitatively greater practice backing it.  More importantly, the prece-
dents are only partially contradictory:  from Monroe’s Administration 
through Lincoln’s, it was agreed that participation in a tribunal that 
would have criminal jurisdiction over Americans would be unconstitu-
tional.  This undisputed proposition happens to be most relevant to the 
international courts that the United States might join in the near future. 
1.  The Stronger Precedent 
Both in the 1820s and 1860s, positions on the treaty were largely 
congruent with the dominant political trends.  In the 1820s, when 
search was anathema and the British were still regarded with suspi-
cion, the proposed British treaty was widely opposed, and it was easy 
for people to conclude that the mixed-commission proposal was un-
constitutional.  During the Civil War, by contrast, amity with the Brit-
ish was of paramount importance, and all who supported the war also 
supported the treaty. 
Only in the 1820s did politicians of different views agree about the 
mixed commissions.305  The House of Representatives strongly favored 
a joint arrangement with the British, to the extent of endorsing the 
highly controversial concessions on search.  Yet, while it expressed a 
willingness to adopt whatever measures were necessary to end the 
slave trade, it could not concede mixed commissions.  These conces-
sions against interest have no parallel in the Civil War episode, where 
the official view of the commissions lined up with expediency. 
Furthermore, the earlier opposition to mixed courts was the 
product of greater deliberation.  With the acceptance of the courts, 
the constitutional discussion was limited to one afternoon, with only 
 
305 A greater diversity of political views was represented in Congress in the 1820s 
than in 1862, when many Southern seats were empty. 
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one speech recorded.  The treaty was an exceptional wartime meas-
ure.  Its backers recognized this, as did subsequent historians.  Finally, 
the acceptance of commissions only came after their role had become 
moot; back when the courts might have had an active docket, they 
were regarded as unconstitutional.  In retrospect, the eventual ac-
quiescence to Britain’s longstanding proposal seems like a brief aber-
ration, in a time of crisis, amidst an otherwise consistent practice. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the reversal occurred almost by defini-
tion weakens the strength of the earlier precedent.  It suggests, at the 
very least, that the Monroe Administration’s constitutional views had 
not attained the kind of deep acceptance that would make such a trea-
ty unthinkable.  This might have been due in part to the nature of the 
precedent; inaction can only prove so much.  But it also highlights the 
failure of the Monroe Administration to come up with a clear expla-
nation of the constitutional objection.  Of course, at the time, a brief-
worthy argument was not needed, for there was no appetite in Wash-
ington for signing the treaty in any case.  When the political climate 
changed forty years later, however, the incompleteness of the Mon-
roe Administration’s constitutional arguments made it easier to pass 
the treaty. 
2.  An Area of Agreement 
The ultimate acceptance of the treaty was reconcilable with the 
previous opposition.  The Monroe Administration apparently saw the 
proposed tribunals as criminal courts.  This distinguished them from 
prior international arbitral commissions, which only heard cases in-
volving so-called public rights—civil claims against a sovereign.  Sena-
tor Sumner emphasized their civil character in arguing for the oppo-
site result in 1862.306 
Everyone agreed that it would be unconstitutional to create inter-
national tribunals that would exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. 
citizens.  A court that directly pronounced on the guilt of defendants 
would raise constitutional problems far beyond anything even the 
temporarily emboldened 1862 Senate could have accepted.  The disa-
greement between Sumner and Adams concerned the acceptability of 
 
306 Determining which characterization is accurate is a hard question.  Clearly the 
fact that the case would be in rem would not change its punitive and blame-assigning 
nature.  The slave-trade commission was an unusual court of limited quasi-criminal ju-
risdiction.  It was neither fish nor fowl and could be viewed as either criminal or civil 
depending on one’s perspective or desired result.   
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international courts to adjudicate cases that were less than criminal 
but more than pure “public rights,” which all apparently agreed could 
be put before an international commission like the one created by the 
Jay Treaty.  What they might have disagreed on are the intermediate 
situations—courts that would have jurisdiction over civil enforcement 
actions and common law claims involving private defendants.  The 
implications of the slave-trade courts for criminal tribunals, however, 
are quite strong. 
B.  Implications for International Courts 
The U.S. diplomacy regarding slave-trade courts demonstrates 
that there are serious constitutional questions about the use of inter-
national courts with direct jurisdiction over U.S. nationals.  The pre-
cise limitations are somewhat less clear, and they depend on what one 
thinks the original objections to the courts were and the import of the 
courts’ eventual acceptance during the Civil War.  The U.S. reaction 
to the slave-trade courts supports one of two possible positions.  The 
narrow view of the original rejection of the courts is that the criminal 
jurisdiction of the courts was essential to their constitutional infirmity.  
Yet the Constitution only treats criminal cases as a distinct category for 
certain purposes, such as jury trials and other procedural guarantees.  
Article III, however, does not generally treat criminal cases as a sepa-
rate class.  The objections to the mixed courts, by contrast, were 
broader.  This broader view is that all such courts with civil or quasi-
criminal jurisdiction would also be unconstitutional; the permissibility 
of international courts tracks the public-rights/private-rights distinc-
tion rather than a criminal/civil distinction.  The criminal jurisdiction 
limitation remains even if one takes the 1862 acceptance of the courts 
seriously.  The 1862 acceptance does suggest, however, that interna-
tional courts with powers over the property of American citizens could 
be constitutional. 
Some implications for current international courts seem clear re-
gardless of how one resolves the ambiguities.  The North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tribunals decide public-rights cases—
suits challenging governmental regulatory policy.  Because even the 
Monroe Administration did not see the rejection of the slave-trade 
courts as casting doubt on the Jay Treaty commission, it seems clear that 
tribunals that involve public rights, or that do not even involve private 
individuals, do not fall in the shadow of the slave-trade-court precedent. 
The ICC, by contrast, raises precisely the same constitutional con-
cerns that plagued the slave-trade commissions:  the ICC is expressly 
17 KONTOROVICH FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2009  12:24 PM 
106 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 39 
criminal, for it directly punishes defendants.307  Thus, it would be pre-
cisely the kind of tribunal that was unanimously regarded as constitu-
tionally suspect in the nineteenth century.308 
However, the slave-trade-court experience does not rule out all 
participation in international criminal courts.  Indeed, some of 
Adams’s arguments suggest that some delegations to such tribunals 
could be constitutional.309  America might be able to subject its na-
tionals to ad hoc criminal tribunals, like the modern “mixed commis-
sions” used in Cambodia and Sierra Leone.  The charter of such a 
court could limit its jurisdiction to avoid conflicts with the Constitution, 
for example, by only applying to extraterritorial acts by military person-
nel committed abroad or perhaps to universally cognizable offenses. 
The implications for noncriminal international tribunals are the 
least clear.  Some of the original objections to the slave-trade courts 
were based on an understanding that they were criminal in nature 
(which Article III makes particularly relevant).  Moreover, the eventual 
adoption of the slave-trade treaty during the Civil War, with Sumner’s 
caveat that it only exercise civil powers, suggests that international 
courts could be used for that branch of jurisdiction.  Still, this conclu-
sion seems somewhat less robust, given the extraordinary circumstances 
under which that treaty was adopted.  Even for civil cases, the idea that 
the treaty power cannot trump individual rights is only relevant if the 
case is at “common law,” in the language of the Seventh Amendment.310  
It is unlikely that many cases heard by modern international tribunals 
could be described as “common law” matters, and thus the lack of jury 
should generally not be a problem in noncriminal cases.311 
C.  The Rome Treaty’s Overbreadth 
The slave-trade story does not rule out all participation in interna-
tional criminal tribunals.  Even if there are exceptions to their un-
constitutionality for universal-jurisdiction crimes, military personnel, 
 
307 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 208, art. 77(1) 
(allowing the court to imprison defendants for up to thirty years for offenses within the 
jurisdiction of the court and up to life for certain serious crimes). 
308 See supra subsection V.A.2. 
309 See supra subsections III.D.3-4. 
310 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (preserving the right to trial by jury for most suits at 
common law). 
311 Similarly, the Seventh Amendment question would not have arisen under the 
Lyons-Seward Treaty because civil admiralty proceedings did not have juries. 
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or acts in foreign territory,312 participation in the ICC would remain 
constitutionally dubious because its jurisdiction is not limited to those 
exceptions.313  First, some of the offenses over which the ICC has juris-
diction, such as aggression and violations of the Geneva Convention 
short of grave breaches, are not universally cognizable.314  Other 
crimes that may be universally cognizable, like genocide, are defined 
in the Rome Statute far more broadly than their universal-jurisdiction 
status in customary international law.  Lacking the participation of 
most great powers, who govern most of the people on Earth,315 the 
treaty does not establish a new rule of customary international law.316  
No doubt the Rome Treaty represents an effort to develop interna-
tional law.  In the views of the Monroe Administration, at least, this 
would not be enough to allow foreign or mixed tribunals to judge U.S. 
citizens.  During the debate over the slave-trade courts, international 
 
312 See supra subsections III.D.3-5. 
313 This also explains why the treaty’s complementarity provisions may reduce but 
not eliminate the frequency of unconstitutional events.  Complementarity allows the 
ICC to proceed with a case when the home state is “unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution.”  Rome Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court, supra note 208, art. 17(1).  However, a jury acquittal, a decision by a U.S. 
Attorney not to bring charges, or a dismissal on a “technicality” particular to the Unit-
ed States could all be taken as “unwillingness” by the ICC.  No U.S. Attorney has inves-
tigated former Secretaries of Defense Cohen and Rumsfeld for their alleged war 
crimes in Serbia and Iraq, respectively.  This complete lack of prosecutorial interest 
could be taken as “unwillingness” sufficient to trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction.  The sub-
sequent ICC prosecution would still suffer all the constitutional infirmities alleged by 
Adams.  Under the treaty, the ICC has the last word in determining when complemen-
tarity applies, and this determination would not be reviewable by any U.S. court, which 
is precisely the problem that Adams stressed.  See id. art. 17(2) (granting the ICC power 
to determine if a state’s failure to prosecute is justified).  Nothing in the slave-trade 
episode suggests that the mixed commissions would have been favored if they limited 
their activities to cases where the United States had chosen not to prosecute or had 
acquitted the defendant.  Indeed, the opposite seems to be the case.   
314 See id. art. 8(2)(b) (cataloging “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in international armed conflict, within the framework of international law”). 
315 The treaty has not been acceded to by the United States, China, India, Rus-
sia, or most Arab nations.  See United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
Treaties.aspx?id=18&subid=A&lang=en (follow “Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 15, 2009). 
316 Adams and Congress clearly took the position, supported by ample British and 
American case law, that treaties delegating jurisdiction did not create universal juris-
diction.  See 42 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 3029 (1823) (letter from John Quincy Adams 
to Alexander Everett) (writing that even after the United States and Britain declared 
the slave trade to be piracy, it was “essential” that vessels seized under the U.S.-British 
treaty were tried by their home state until “the consent of other nations to the general 
outlawry of this traffic as piracy”).  This view still reflects international law. 
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law on the slave trade was clearly evolving toward abolition.  But the 
Monroe Administration believed that whatever exception might exist 
for universal crimes, the United States could not jump the gun by an-
ticipating such developments.317 
Similarly, the ICC’s jurisdiction is in no way limited to military 
personnel.  Normally, the United States avoids potential constitutional 
difficulties with treaty arrangements by attaching reservations that lim-
it its treaty obligations to contexts where they would not violate the 
Constitution.  However, the ICC treaty specifically bars such reserva-
tions, requiring signatory nations to agree to the entire package or 
none of it.318  Thus, if the United States joins the treaty, it would have 
to agree to apply it in the many foreseeable circumstances where it 
would be unconstitutional.  Because of the “no reservations” clause, 
the applicability of the ICC to civilians and non-universal offenses 
would make Senate ratification of the treaty unconstitutional even if 
other applications might be constitutional. 
Finally, the rejection of the mixed tribunals may have stemmed 
from their jurisdiction over U.S. territory.  Yet the ICC exercises juris-
diction over the vessels and all the sovereign territory of all its mem-
bers.319  Furthermore, the exercise of such authority is not speculative.  
Most war crime charges against the United States target senior officials 
for actions they committed in Washington, D.C.  Moreover, the de-
mise of strictly territorial notions of jurisdiction has also carried away 
the view that the Constitution’s protections are strictly territorial.  
Even if Adams would have seen the unconstitutionality as limited, re-
cent decisions about the applicability of the Constitution to foreigners 
abroad may make such a distinction hard to sustain.320 
D.  The Extradition Analogy 
This Section considers two important arguments for the ICC in 
light of the slave-courts correspondence.  Some scholars have argued 
that participating in the ICC would not raise any constitutional con-
 
317 Interestingly, neither Adams nor members of Congress who reviewed his dip-
lomatic correspondence thought that Congress’s power to define and punish offenses 
against the law of nations gave that branch final say on what or when an offense had 
become universal in international law. 
318 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 208, art. 120 
(“No reservations may be made to this Statute.”). 
319 See id. art. 12(2)(a). 
320 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) (granting the right of 
habeas corpus review to an alien detainee held in an area under United States control). 
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cerns because it does not exercise the authority of the United States.  A 
related claim is that participation in the ICC could be seen as no more 
problematic than an extradition treaty.  This Section will explain how 
this latter argument was apparently rejected with regard to the slave 
courts and suggest some reasons why it may not have been persuasive. 
U.S. citizens can, pursuant to extradition treaties, be sent for trial 
in foreign courts, although these courts do not provide defendants 
with American constitutional rights or judicial structures.321  Addition-
ally, extradition does not raise Article III concerns:  the foreign court 
is not exercising the judicial power of the United States, but rather its 
own authority.  The only role the United States plays in an extradition 
is handing over the defendant.322 
Similar arguments have been made in favor of participation in in-
ternational courts, which are analogous to courts of a foreign state.323  
The ICC has its own international legal personality and is indepen-
dent of the United States.  In this view, the lack of constitutional pro-
tections afforded by the ICC is as unimportant as the lack of such pro-
tections offered by any country to which Americans might be extradited. 
Yet the mixed-commission precedent suggests that delegating 
judicial power to international courts in which the United States partici-
pates is more constitutionally problematic than extradition.  The 
extradition argument could have been made with equivalent logic in 
defense of the slave-trade courts.  Extradition mechanisms had existed 
since the Jay Treaty.324  The rendition of an alleged pirate to Britain in 
1799 occasioned one of the sharpest and most memorable constitu-
tional controversies of the early Republic.325  Yet no one defended 
mixed commissions as a type of extradition.  While the constitutionali-
ty of extradition was largely untested in the 1820s, Sumner did not in-
 
321 While the precise basis for the constitutionality of extradition is obscure, the 
practice has been decisively accepted in practice.   
322 See, e.g., Scheffer & Cox, supra note 5, at 1015-19 (describing the practice of 
U.S. courts, when reviewing whether to extradite a defendant, of not inquiring into the 
due process protections or lack thereof in the receiving state).  
323 See, e.g., Daryl Mundis, Editorial Comment, The United States of America and Inter-
national Justice:  Has Lady Liberty Lost Her Way?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 2, 6 (2004) (arguing 
that there is no difference between extradition to a foreign country and to the ICC). 
324 See Jay Treaty, supra note 70, art. 27 (agreeing with Britain to mutually “deliver 
up to justice all persons, who, being charged with murder or forgery, committed within 
the jurisdiction of another, shall seek an asylum”). 
325 See United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 833 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175) 
(upholding the extradition of an alleged mutineer of uncertain nationality to Britain 
pursuant to the 1794 Jay Treaty); Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jona-
than Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229 (1990) (discussing the Robins case and its implications). 
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voke extradition as a precedent in 1862, even though by then the first 
cases broadly sustaining its constitutionality had been decided.326 
One can try to understand why the nineteenth-century view did 
not see the slave-trade tribunals as purely foreign courts outside the 
application of the Constitution.  International courts and foreign 
states can be distinguished by the source of their jurisdiction.  Extradi-
tion has always been understood as the rendition of someone to a for-
eign state within whose sovereign jurisdiction she had allegedly com-
mitted a crime.327  The constitutional justification is that otherwise the 
United States, unable to punish the offenders, would become a haven 
for criminals.328  Extradition merely gives the foreign state personal ju-
risdiction; it does not create subject-matter or prescriptive jurisdiction.  
Yet with the mixed commissions, as with the ICC, it is the “extradition” 
treaty itself that gives the non–U.S. tribunal authority over U.S. na-
tionals or territory.329 
In extradition cases, the foreign state is exercising its own sove-
reign authority.  With mixed courts, on the other hand, the authority 
would have been delegated by the United States.  This may help ex-
plain one of the Monroe Administration’s recurring objections to the 
 
326 See, e.g., In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 112-13 (1852) (plurality opinion) 
(noting with approval the practice of extradition). 
327 The Jay Treaty, as well as subsequent extradition agreements, have been con-
fined to crimes “committed within the jurisdiction” of the parties.  See, e.g., Jay Treaty, 
supra note 70, art. 27.  Indeed, James Madison explained that  
[t]his [extradition] act authorises [ye] surrender of a Citizen to a foreign So-
vereign within whose acknowledged jurisdiction the citizen shall commit a crime, of 
[which] satisfactory proof shall be exhibited to Congress, and for which in the 
judgment of Congress the law of nations exacts such surrender. . . . The op-
ponents contended that such surrenders were unknown to the law of nations, 
and were interdicted by our declaration of Rights. . . . With regard to the bill of 
rights, it was alleged to be no more or rather less violated by considering crimes commit-
ted [against] other laws as not falling under the notice of our own, and sending our 
Citizens to be tried where the cause of trial arose, than to try them under our 
own laws without a jury of the vicinage, and without being confronted with 
their accusers or witnesses; as must be the case, if they be tried at all for such 
offences under our own laws.  
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson ( Jan. 9, 1785), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 110-11 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901) (emphasis added). 
328 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 327, at 111 
(“And to say that such offenders [against foreign law] could neither be given up for 
punishment, nor be punished within their own Country, would amount to a licence for 
every aggression . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
329 The ICC might obtain jurisdiction over Americans based on their presence in 
the territory of another member State, but the discussion here focuses on that jurisdic-
tion which is a result of U.S. participation in the treaty. 
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tribunals.  Wirt thought the slave-trade court, unlike the Jay Treaty 
commission, was unconstitutional because it would “carry into effect 
our municipal and penal statutes.”330  The conduct that the mixed 
commissions would punish was criminal under U.S. law.  The commis-
sion would only have jurisdiction if given it by treaty, and it was the 
constitutionality of such a treaty that was itself in question. 
There is no constitutional precedent to support the extradition 
for trial in Saudi Arabia of a U.S. citizen for a pickpocketing that hap-
pened in New York.  That is judicial outsourcing, not extradition.  It 
goes beyond the rationale for allowing extradition in the first place.  
Indeed, the extradition analogy may have been anticipated by Adams 
when he told Canning that trial before a purely foreign tribunal 
would be unconstitutional.331  There was no constitutional problem 
per se with sending an American for trial before a British court.  But 
that presumed the crime was committed within British jurisdiction.  
Because the slave trade was not yet piracy under international law, it 
was an offense only against the jurisdiction of the United States.  
Sending offenders for trial in Britain would in effect have been extra-
dition to a random country.332 
Moreover, the involvement of U.S. judges makes international tri-
bunals entirely different from a typical extradition.  It makes it in part 
an exercise of U.S. power.333  Paradoxically, rendering a U.S. national to 
 
330 Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams, supra note 104, at 151; see also United States v. 
Watkins, 28 F. Cas. 419, 462 (C.C.D.C. 1829) (No. 16,649) (Thruston, J., dissenting) 
(“The negotiation with Great Britain, respecting the suppression of the slave trade, failed 
upon the ground that the United States could not give power to the courts of another 
nation to punish the violation of the laws of the United States.”); Letter from Albert Gal-
latin to John Quincy Adams, supra note 200, at 229-30 (arguing that it would violate the 
Constitution for mixed commissions to try citizens for “violation of our own laws”). 
331 Canning had sarcastically suggested to Adams that if mixed courts were constitu-
tionally problematic, there could be no problem with prosecuting slave traders in “the 
ordinary way”:  by regular (British) admiralty courts.  See 42 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 
3007-08 (1823).  Not surprisingly, Adams rejected this uneven proposal out-of-hand:  
[I]t might seem needless to remark, that the Constitutional objection could 
not diminish in proportion as its cause should increase, or that the Power in-
competent to make American citizens amenable to a court consisting one-half 
of foreigners, should be adequate to place their liberty, their fortune, and 
their fame, at the disposal of tribunals, entirely foreign.   
42 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 3010, 3012 (1823). 
332 See id. at 3012 (arguing that under the Constitution there is no right for anoth-
er nation to try local offenders). 
333 It is difficult to say what proportion of American judges makes a tribunal 
“mixed” enough to be considered an exercise of the judicial power of the United 
States.  The slave-trade precedent suggests that as little as one-third is a problem, and 
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an international tribunal on which the United States is not represented 
may be constitutionally less problematic than giving her over to a mixed 
court, though of course it would be more difficult politically. 
One might answer the extradition analogy by observing that, to 
the extent the international court has jurisdiction over U.S. citizens, it 
is because it has been given those powers by the United States.  That 
action is in functional terms a delegation of U.S. authority.  The ICC 
certainly cannot violate Article III or any other constitutional provi-
sion.  Yet the signing and ratification of a treaty empowering it is sure-
ly an exercise of the legislative and executive power of the United 
States.  The response to the slave-trade court shows that even if consti-
tutional arguments do not lie against the court, they can be made di-
rectly against the treaty that empowers it. 
Professor Pfander makes a more nuanced version of the “non-
U.S.” argument.  In his view, the legitimacy of non–Article III courts is 
based on the Tribunals Clause of Article I, which gives Congress con-
siderable latitude to create tribunals so long as they remain in some 
sense inferior to Article III tribunals.  International courts, however, 
are not “constituted” by Congress.334  Thus, the Tribunals Clause is in-
applicable, and there is no need for such courts to be amenable to Ar-
ticle III judicial review.335  This conclusion follows nicely from Profes-
sor Pfander’s basic view of the inferiority requirement.  It is also 
potentially consistent with the slave-trade precedent.  In a two-nation 
mixed tribunal, without the participation of one country, there is no 
international court.  As the number of participating nations increases, 
the argument that the additional ones “constitute” an already existing 
court decreases.  (The Monroe Administration did repeatedly use words 
like “establish” and “institute” to describe the role that the United States 
 
the ICC sits in panels of three (though U.S. participation in a U.S. case is not guaran-
teed).  Still, were an American to sit on a three-judge panel, she would be left with the 
outcome-determinative decision whenever the other two were divided.  It would be 
hard to say in such a case that the U.S. involvement was diluted to the extent of being 
inconsequential.  Still, with a large enough panel of judges, one can imagine the U.S. 
role being de minimis. 
334 See Pfander, supra note 25, at 767-68 (highlighting how NAFTA panels are not 
standard Article III tribunals).  Put differently, this view would say that while non–
Article III courts created under the Tribunals Clause must be inferior, the Treaty 
Clause contains no such requirement for tribunals that might be created or joined 
through that power. 
335 See id.  Pfander notes that while such courts may not be objectionable on non-
delegation grounds, they would still have to adhere to other constitutional norms.  See 
id. at 768 n.596 (describing constitutional protections in extradition hearings). 
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was being asked to play in relation to the mixed courts, though this 
again may have been a function of their binational structure.) 
Yet the response to the extradition argument may be repeated 
here, though perhaps not as forcefully.  While international courts are 
not “creatures of Congress,”336 to the extent that they have power over 
Americans, it is because they have been given these powers by Ameri-
can officials.  While an international court as a whole may not be 
“constituted” by Congress, its applicability to Americans in a sense is.  
By ratifying the Rome Statute, one might think that the Senate “con-
stitutes” the ICC as a court that can try Americans, even though the ICC 
was already constituted with respect to other countries. 
E.  Non–Article III Courts and the Treaty Power 
To say—as Missouri v. Holland did—that the treaty power is unen-
cumbered by vertical restraints of federalism is one thing; to say that 
horizontal checks do not matter is a much broader extension.  The 
former means federalism does not apply when the United States acts 
internationally.  This makes sense—federalism is an internal arrange-
ment, but the country must present a unified face to the world.  The 
latter, broader position would mean that Congress could, pursuant to 
a treaty, gut the powers of the other branches.  Adams’s view that 
Congress can create international courts as long as there would be 
some Article III review treats the international courts as something 
like territorial courts.  In international matters one need not worry 
about Article III’s role in protecting the jurisdiction of the courts of 
quasi-sovereign states, yet checks and balances on the level of the national 
government still apply. 
The understanding of the treaty power articulated at the time 
suggests that it is limited by more than just Bill of Rights protections.  
It is also limited at least by structural provisions designed for individu-
al benefit, such as the review of convictions by an Article III tribunal.  
As for the question of permissibility of non–Article III courts, the un-
derstanding adopted appears to track something like the pub-
lic/private rights distinction, perhaps giving some greater credibility 
to this much maligned distinction. 
 
336 Id. at 768. 
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CONCLUSION 
The constitutionality of the International Criminal Court is not a 
case of first impression.  The slave-trade courts proposed by Britain 
provide the closest analogy available to the ICC—they were specifically 
designed to deal with criminal human rights offenses committed by 
U.S. citizens.  Despite the conflicted nature of the slave-trade-court 
precedent, one proposition was agreed to by everyone from 1818 to 
1870:  for criminal matters involving U.S. citizens, jurisdiction can on-
ly be given to international tribunals that are reviewable by Article III 
courts and that provide jury trials and related constitutional rights 
protections. 
The history is too specific to categorically reject the constitutional-
ity of international criminal courts.  If anything, it confirms that using 
international tribunals more generally does not necessarily create 
nondelegation problems.  Instead, it suggests limits on the jurisdiction 
and procedures of courts in which the United States could participate.  
Thus, the history can be seen as providing a basis for designing inter-
national courts that avoid constitutional obstacles.  For example, un-
iversally cognizable crimes and offenses by service members may be 
exceptions to the rule against American participation in international 
criminal tribunals.  This would allow for the United States to agree to 
much of that with which international criminal tribunals currently 
concern themselves. 
The story of the slave-trade courts also offers some more general 
lessons.  First, it demonstrates that American exceptionalism in inter-
national law—the rejection of participation in certain large interna-
tional legal institutions—did not begin in recent years.  This is at least 
a partial correction to the argument that the United States enthusias-
tically supported international institutions in the Republic’s early 
years, when its power was weak.337 
Second, the British plan combined both executive and judicial 
functions:  a dedicated naval squadron with the mixed courts.  The 
former was much more expensive to maintain than the latter.  Yet the 
judicial phase could only be successful to the extent that the navy was 
searching suspect ships.  The pursuit of a search treaty by Britain and 
its signature by Adams even after mixed courts had been rejected sug-
 
337 See ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER:  AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE 
NEW WORLD ORDER 9 (2003) (arguing that American foreign policy in the early years 
of the Republic was more concerned with advancing international law, which the fled-
gling state hoped would constrain greater powers more than itself). 
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gests that everyone agreed that if one had to choose between the ex-
ecutive and judicial components, the former would be more impor-
tant.  By contrast, today’s international criminal courts invariably di-
vorce enforcement from adjudication, focusing solely on the latter.  As 
a result, they have great difficulty bringing cases, especially since the 
crimes in their purview are generally committed by organized armed 
forces often backed by a government. 
 
